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Abstract
This Article argues that while much of the intellectual energy has
focused on the economics of executive pay, the challenge of executive
compensation is as much a challenge of human behavior as it is one of
economics. The raison d'tre of pay for performance ("PFP") is to
motivate executives to make decisions that are in the best interest of their
firm and its shareholders. Attention to the relevant individual,
situational, cultural, and institutional dynamics (what I term behavioral
dynamics) that affect how executives are motivated and how they value
future rewards is critical for the sustainability of PFP as a model of
compensation design.
Drawing on salient research in the cognitive science and decision-
making literature, the Article invites consideration on how relevant
behavioral dynamics could affect our assessment of PFP as a
motivational tool. The Article concludes by suggesting five potential
ways to incorporate behavioral dynamics into compensation policy and
design.
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Our view is that it is important to consider behavioral responses. Any
proposals for changes in the design of compensation contracts should
consider how executives alter their behavior as a result of the changes.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Why do football coaches overwhelmingly favor punting on fourth
down even though they have at least another chance to move the ball
forward or, better yet, score a touchdown? Before answering this
question, consider that the decision to always punt on fourth down is not
a rational one in most cases, yet coaches continue to rely on the punt
even in situations where there are other options that statistically increase
their probability of winning.
2
There is a copious body of literature on sports decision-making that
has struggled with this question and which suggests that possible reasons
for this seemingly irrational behavior include various factors such as
hidden prejudices, behavioral biases, the human tendency to "play it
safe" rather than go for a potentially large return, the fear of retribution,
3
and the fact that coaches may be risk averse.
Like football coaches who are charged with making specific
strategic choices that affect the probability of their team winning and
making a profit, top executives of public corporations are charged with
making specific strategic decisions that affect their company's long-term
growth and profit. These executives' compensation packages are
supposed to be designed in a way that incentivizes them to do just that,
yet, like their football coach counterparts, these executives are subject to
behavioral factors that affect whether a given compensation package
actually incentivizes them to make decisions beneficial to their firm and
its shareholders. Understanding what these factors might be is critical to
understanding how to design compensation packages that truly do
incentivize executives to consistently make long-term value-enhancing
decisions.
This Article argues that while much of the intellectual energy has
focused on the economics of executive pay, the challenge of executive
compensation is as much a challenge of human behavior as it is one of
economics. The raison d'6tre of pay for performance ("PFP") is to
motivate executives to make decisions that are in the best interest of their
1. Michael Faulkender et al., Executive Compensation: An Overview of Research on
Corporate Practices and Proposed Reforms, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2010, at 107, 113.
2. See, e.g., Adam Himmelsbach, Punting Less Can Be Rewarding, but Coaches Aren't
Risking Jobs on It, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2012, at SP9.
3. Id.
2012]
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firm and shareholders. An appreciation for salient behavioral factors
that affect how people are motivated and how they value future rewards
is critical for the sustainability of PFP as a model of compensation
design. These behavioral factors include various individual, situational,
cultural and institutional dynamics (what I term "behavioral dynamics")
that shape and dictate the ideal compensation package for a given
executive at a given firm.
The dominant normative claim in compensation design is that the
way to incentivize executives to make long-term value-enhancing
decisions is to tie PFP by linking a substantial portion of that executive's
pay to his or her firm's economic performance. 5 However, numerous
stories such as the 2008 UBS tax evasion, the 2001-2002 collapses of
Enron and WorldCom, and the 2008 implosion of Lehman Brothers
where executives made decisions which were antithetical to the long-
term interests of their companies, have called into question whether the
promise of mere economic reward actually incentivizes an executive to
achieve greater long-term value for his or her firm.6 Policy-makers and
academics have attempted to address this question by tinkering with the
economic structure of the relationship between the executive's pay and
his or her firm's performance, and by refining the operating metrics
against which performance is measured. However, after almost two
decades of tinkering with the economics of the relationship between pay
and performance, it is unclear that simply tying pay to financial
performance is enough to truly incentivize executives to make these
value-enhancing decisions.
While the economic aspects of executive compensation no doubt
play a part, there is a vast body of behavioral literature that suggests that
behavioral dynamics do as well. In a 1991 study of how executives'
actions affect their valuation of their compensation, the researchers'
empirical findings reflected this intuition.7 The study concluded that
4. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 19 (2004) (describing the PFP model).
5. See id.; Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 323 (1976); Michael C.
Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay, but How, HARV. Bus.
REV., May-June 1990, at 138, 139.
6. See Lynnley Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Pleads Guilty in Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, June
20, 2008, at C1; Susanne Craig et al., AIG, Lehman Shock Hits World Markets, WALL ST. J., Sept.
16, 2008, at Al; Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S.
Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at Al; Rebecca Smith, Enron Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy,
Sues Dynegy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A3.
7. See generally Richard A. Lambert et al., Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive
Compensation, 29 J. ACCT. RES. 129 (1991) (providing "a framework for valuing a compensation
contract from the perspective of a manager").
[Vol. 41:91
BEYOND ECONOMICS IN PAYFOR PERFORMANCE
executive compensation "valuation formulas that ignore [individual and
behavioral] parameters in calculating executive
compensation ... create[] a measurement error problem that can
generate misleading inferences."8
Viewing executive compensation through a behavioral dynamics
lens shifts the focus away from the economic aspects of compensation
design to the human aspects that could affect the choice and efficacy of a
given compensation design. In doing so this Article makes at least two
contributions to the executive compensation literature and discourse.
First, it augments the current body of corporate law literature, by
considering behavioral research on decision-making under uncertainty
and intrinsic motivation as a dynamic whole.9 Second, it proposes five
ways to effectively use behavioral dynamics to enhance the efficacy of
the PFP framework.
Part II.A of this Article provides an overview of the dynamic nature
of the executive compensation landscape and describes the general
features of a typical executive compensation package. Additionally, Part
II.A discusses the rise of the PFP and the optimal contracting view and
managerial power approach, which both define how the PFP model has
developed and is currently used.10 The optimal contracting school views
executive compensation as a reflection of an arms-length bargaining
process in which executives are rewarded for enhancing shareholder
value. 1 The managerial power approach views executive compensation
as a reflection of a process whereby CEOs exert enormous influence
over the board to "extract rents" and receive handsome windfalls.
1 2
Thus, the optimal contract model is perhaps more aspirational, while the
managerial power approach exhibits tempered realism. Both approaches,
however, espouse a relatively static and economic conception of human
behavior, and, as such, the current PFP model is expressly economic in
both intent and design. Part II.A acknowledges the benefits to this
approach, primarily that it easily lends itself to algorithmic and
mathematical succinctness, and discusses several of its drawbacks. For
example, PFP is more concerned with motivating a firm's CEO and
other top executives to act in the long-term best interest of the firm and
its shareholders, and less concerned with the recruitment and retention
functions of compensation.
8. Id. at 145.
9. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance: The Tournament
Alternative, 54 EMORY L.J. 1557, 1562, 1596 (2005).
10. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4, at 19; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 323.
11. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4, at 19.
12. See id.
2012]
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Part III applies behavioral science learning to explore four issues
that generate concern in executive compensation and which are often
primarily analyzed through a financial or economic lens. The four issues
examined in Part III concern: (1) the optimal length of an executive
compensation contract, (2) the optimum "compensation mix," (3)
perceived abuses by companies and boards in their selection of peer
groups and their use of median compensation figures, and (4) the use of
ex ante financial metrics. Behavioral theories discussed in Part III
include (1) findings on inter-temporal decision making, (2) findings on
decision-making under uncertainty, (3) findings on how humans judge
the quality of a decision, and (4) and findings on the relationship
between rewards and intrinsic motivation. My objective in Part III is to
show how an application of a behavioral science perspective to concerns
that have been examined predominantly through a purely economic lens
helps unlock certain insights. One overarching insight that emerges in
the process of viewing executive compensation design through a
behavioral frame is that a PFP model that focuses solely on the economic
aspects of how to incentivize executives, may (1) simultaneously under-
incentivize executives to achieve long-term growth (due to factors such
as hyperbolic discounting discussed in Part III.A) while (2) over-
incentivizing executives to exhibit behavior that erodes intrinsic
motivations to act in a selfless way towards the corporation (so-called
"crowding out" phenomenon, which is discussed in Part II.D).
To elaborate, behavioral studies on inter-temporal decision-
making-i.e., how people make decisions across different time frames-
shed light on some of the behavioral dynamics that impact one's
decision-making process when one is asked to make a decision about
some occurrence in the future. For example, one's preference for tickets
to the Final Four of the NCAA Basketball Tournament may change
depending on whether the tickets offered are for next week's Final Four,
next year's Final Four, or the Final Four in 2017. Since executive
compensation contracts are typically designed to span a range of time
frames (for example, salaries are paid monthly, bonuses are paid
annually, and other payments will be earned at some point after one
year), understanding how individuals evaluate rewards over a series of
time frames is essential to assessing the efficacy of the current PFP
model. Of particular interest to this investigation are the behavioral
science findings of hyperbolic discounting, variable discount rates,
diminishing marginal utility in the context of hyperbolic discounting,
optimism bias, and the sequencing effect, which individually and
collectively suggest that simply promising executives large rewards at
some point in the future may not actually motivate them to take the
[Vol. 41:91
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desired course of action." As developed in Part III, if rewards occur at a
point too distant in the future, or if the sum total of the rewards do not
represent an improvement over time and/or if diminishing marginal
utility has occurred, then the executive will not attach as much value to
these rewards, hence he or she will not be optimally incentivized to
achieve these rewards.
Second, theories on how people determine value in the face of
unknown variables (i.e., make decisions under uncertainty) augment our
understanding of how people make decisions across time frames. Even
assuming time is not a factor in decision-making, these studies focus on
how people process information and determine value in the face of
unknown variables. In particular, behavioral findings on "herding" and
"anchoring and adjustment" are considered. "Herding" refers to the
tendency of individuals to mimic the actions (both rational and
irrational) of a large group-the more people undertake an action the
more likely it is that others exposed to the action will follow suit.
14
"Anchoring and adjustment" refers to the tendency to determine value by
making short-cut estimates based on an initial value that is then adjusted
to yield the final value, even though that initial value may be based on an
error in judgment.1 5 Part III considers whether the widespread adoption
of PFP in executive compensation contracts, and the similarity in how
PFP design is described in firms' annual proxy statements, are a
reflection of market rationality and optimal contracting, or whether they
represent a "false positive" as a result of irrational herding and/or
anchoring and adjustment.
Third, are behavioral findings on how people judge the quality of a
given decision by looking at the resulting outcome rather than the quality
of the decision process (the so-called "outcome effect" or "outcome
bias"). 16 Part III considers whether the reliance on outward metrics in the
PFP model actually results in suboptimal behavior because the model
focuses solely on output and does not reward input. This in turn could
encourage executives to engage in questionable behavior (such as
manipulating earnings) solely to satisfy the desire to achieve the
stated outcome.'
7
Fourth, are behavioral theories on the relationship between
promised reward and intrinsic motivation. In this regard, behavioral
13. See infra Part lI.
14. See infra Part 111.
15. See infra Part 11.
16. For a discussion of outcome bias, see Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias
in Decision Evaluation, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 570-71, 578 (1988).
17. See Faulkender et al., supra note 1, at 109.
2012]
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findings on "crowding out" are discussed. "Crowding out" refers to the
phenomenon where paying a monetary reward to motivate an individual
to undertake some socially beneficial act may actually lead to the
opposite result because it "crowds out" that individual's intrinsic
motivation to behave "prosocially." 18 As discussed in Part III, the
"crowding out" phenomenon has been observed and documented in
several other areas, including land use regulation and environmental
policy. "Crowding out" presents serious complications in executive
compensation design, where the dominant consensus is that the way to
rein in excessive executive compensation is to offer financial incentives
that are tied to pre-defined metrics. The phenomenon of "crowding out"
means that we may be unintentionally cultivating and/or encouraging a
culture where executives are focused solely on meeting some pre-
defined metric, and are less concerned with undertaking prosocial
behaviors since PFP and the market may not reward them for these.
Furthermore, in today's world where at least some segment of investors
is becoming more focused on corporate social responsibility issues long-
term value creation, "impact investing"19 and "creating shared value"
initiatives, 20 engendering a culture that "crowds out" may be the exact
opposite of the direction in which we should be moving.
Part IV draws on the behavioral insights gleaned from Part III and
explores ways to improve upon the PFP model to better achieve its
stated goal of motivating executives to make decisions that are in the
best interests of the firm and its shareholders. Rather than focusing on
the economic nature of executive compensation, the solutions espoused
in Part V leave room for continued refinement of economic aspects of
compensation, and instead focus on ways to reduce the dissonance
between the PFP prescription and the realities of human decision-making
and motivation.
In particular, Part IV explores two categories of solutions: first are
solutions that focus on the compensation model itself, and second are
solutions that focus on using behavioral insights to cultivate an
environment that supports PFP's normative goal of motivating
18. See LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: How GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE
191-92 (2011).
19. Impact investing refers to investments made based not only on the financial return of the
investment, but also the social and environmental impact of that investment. E.g., Paul Sullivan,
With Impact Investing, A Focus on More Than Returns, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/your-money/24wealth.html.
20. Shared value investing "recognizes that societal needs.., define markets. It also
recognizes that societal harms or weaknesses frequently create internal costs for firms .... Shared
value, then, is... about expanding the total pool of economic and social value." Michael E. Porter
& Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, HARv. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 62,65.
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executives to act in the best interests of others. With respect to the first
category of solutions, Part IV explores how behavioral dynamics could
be built into valuation models for a compensation contract. Part IV also
explores how building in non-financial measures of "performance" into
the model could lessen the presence of the "crowding out" effect. With
respect to the second category of solutions, Part IV considers the role of
reputation and shaming as motivational tools; the role of diversity in
overcoming the optimism effect and the anchoring and adjustment
effects; the use of ex post and non-monetary rewards such as plaques,
trophies, and public awards, as a way to incentivize without "crowding
out" other intrinsic values; and the use of "framing" techniques to
influence behavior. In addition, Part IV considers current features of
executive compensation design that should be encouraged from a
behavioral dynamics perspective. These include the use of "claw
backs," 2 1 restricted stock options, and escrow accounts, which may
actually incentivize executives to act in the desired way-a result due to
the "endowment effect," which recognizes that people generally have a
harder time giving up something once they have earned it.
To be clear, although PFP has several limitations which I discuss in
Part IV.A.3, I am not advocating that the PFP model be discarded
wholesale, because I do believe that PFP can provide a useful analytical
framework for determining and assessing compensation design. What I
am advocating, however, is that in order to achieve its stated goal of
incentivizing executives to behave in a manner that leads to greater
efficiency and economic performance, the PFP model must be willing to
take into account behavioral insights that affect how executives actually
behave in response to the offered compensation.
As mentioned before and as developed in greater detail in this
Article, a purely economic conception of what it means to "incentivize"
will either fail to truly incentivize, or over-incentivize executives and
suppress certain intrinsic motivations which we should want to
encourage from a PFP perspective. Pursuing a PFP model without
accounting for behavioral dynamics is akin to shooting darts in the dark.
21. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006) (providing for the forfeiture of
"bonus[es] or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation" by CEOs and CFOs during the
first twelve-month period after the first public issuance or filing of a financial document detailing
the reporting requirement to which the issuer was not compliant as a result of misconduct); Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4 (Supp. IV 2011)
(discussing the recovery of certain bonuses and profits from executives); see also infra Part llI.D. I
(discussing clawbacks).
20121
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II. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND PFP
A. Executive Compensation
1. Typical Executive Compensation Process and Package
In a public corporation, the compensation committee of the board of
directors typically determines executive compensation. Compensation
committees often use outside compensation consultants to assist them in
evaluating and developing appropriate executive compensation policies
and practices, and in determining specific compensation packages for
individual executives. The listing standards of the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") and the NASDAQ Stock Market ("NASDAQ")
require that the compensation committee be composed solely of
"independent" directors. This requirement is meant to ensure that
executive compensation decisions are made on an arms-length, conflict-
free basis, resulting in a compensation package that is in the best interest
of the corporation's shareholders.22
In designing an executive compensation package, the compensation
committee must take into account various factors, such as: the interest of
the executive whose compensation they are charged with determining;
the interest of the corporation; the corporation's shareholders; proxy
advisor policies and their stance on certain features of executive
compensation packages; minimizing the chances of litigation based on
their defined executive compensation; the compensation packages of
peer firms and firms within their industry; movement in the stock
market; potential changes in law; potential changes in power during an
election year; and the broader economy. 3 In addition, the compensation
committee must ensure compliance with an inter-tangled framework of
both state and federal laws, stock exchange listing requirements, and
22. NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.05(a) (2013); NASDAQ
STOCK MKT., NASDAQ MANUAL § 5605(d)(2) (2013).
23. See, e.g., MERIDIAN COMPENSATION PARTNERS, LLC, 2012 TRENDS AND
DEVELOPMENTS IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 12 (Apr. 2012) [hereinafter MERIDIAN, 2012
TRENDS], available at http://www.meridiancp.com/images/uploads/2012_Trends and
Developments in ExecutiveCompensationSurveyResults.pdf.
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accounting standards.24  The task of designing an appropriate
compensation package is thus complicated and dynamic.
Nevertheless, in spite of this dynamism, the typical executive
compensation package is quite uniform across firms of varying sizes and
industries.25 The typical executive compensation package consists of:
* Base salary
" Performance based annual incentive (bonus)
" Performance based long term incentive
* Benefits
* Executive Perquisites
" Contingent Payments.
26
The base salary is typically stated as an annual salary, and generally
does not exceed one million dollars because of tax implications (which
are discussed below). The annual incentive is comprised of the annual
bonus, which is usually paid in cash and can often amount to twice the
executive's annual salary.27 Most annual bonuses include a two-tiered
structure with a "target" level which is the executive's normal expected
performance, and a "stretch" component, which is only earned if the
corporation achieves above-ordinary results. The purpose of the annual
incentive "is to compensate executives for achieving the company's
short-term business strateg[ies]." 28
24. See David J. Walker, The Law and Economics of Executive Compensation: Theory and
Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 233 (Claire A. Hill &
Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012). In terms of federal law, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act contains several provisions related to executive compensation, including
requirements that public company shareholders be given a non-binding vote on executive pay (so-
called "say on pay"). See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78n-1. Similarly, the Troubled Assets Relief Program restricts companies that received
federal bailout money in the types and amount of compensation they can pay their executives.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (Supp. IV 2011). The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, various SEC rules and regulations, and various tax regulations, are the main
laws which govern and/or impact both the procedural and substantive aspects of executive
compensation. Walker, supra, at 233. Under state law, the appropriateness of an executive's
compensation package is typically judged under a "waste standard," which requires that a
compensation decision be upheld unless the plaintiff can show that the compensation was both
irrational and amounted to a disproportionate exchange. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73-75 (Del. 2006).
25. See Walker, supra note 24, at 236-37.
26. The Basics of Executive Pay Packages, CENTER ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION,
http://www.execcomp.orgfbasics/basicspackages.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) [hereinafter
Basics].
27. Annual Incentive, CENTER ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, http://www.execcomp.orgl
basics/basics bonus.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
28. Id.
2012]
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Performance-based long-term incentives, which include:
* compensation in the form of stock
• stock options
* restricted stock
* performance-vested stock, options, or similar devices
are by far the largest component of executive pay.29 As the name
suggests, the stated purpose of long-term incentives "is to reward
executives for achieving the company's [long-term] strategic objectives
that... maximize shareholder value."-30 The performance period for
measuring achievement of a long-term objective is usually three to five
years.31 The executive typically does not receive any pay from the
incentive until the end of the performance period and the amount of
remuneration received is based on achievement of the predefined metric.
Typically, performance-based long-term incentives like annual
incentives also include target and stretch components to encourage
executives to achieve superior results.32
Contingent payments are comprised of payments due to the
executive in the event of severance or a change in control. Severance
agreements provide for payments to executives in the event of a
voluntary or involuntary termination. Change-in-control agreements,
which are also known as "golden parachutes," are meant to compensate
executives for job loss due to a merger or sale.33
Typically, executives also receive benefits like those offered to
salaried employees, including "statutory benefits such as Social Security,
Medicare, Workers Compensation, and Unemployment Insurance,"
along with several company benefits such as vacation, maternity and
paternity leave, sick days, life insurance, and medical insurance.34 Unlike
salaried employees, however, "executives are often eligible to participate
in special retirement plans," such as nonqualified deferred compensation
plans and supplemental employee retirement plans.35
Finally, "perquisites or 'perks' constitute additional compensation
for senior executives which are not available to other salaried
29. Long-Term Incentive, CENTER ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, http://www.execcomp.org
/basics/basics lti.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Conditional Payments: Severance and Change-in-Control Agreements, CENTER ON
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, http://www.execcomp.org/basics/basics bonus.aspx (last visited Feb.
7,2013).
34. Benefits, CENTER ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, http://www.execcomp.org/basics
/basics benefits.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
35. Id.
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employees," such as convenient parking, use of the company jet, and
relocation expenditures. 36 While perks provide a favorite target for the
media as examples of compensation excesses, 37 executive perks typically
constitute a relatively small percentage of executive pay, usually ranging
from one to five percent.38
2. The Normative Rise of PFP and the Limits of a Financial
Theory Approach
The rise of PFP as an ideology can be traced back to a 1990 article
in the Harvard Business Review by economists Michael Jensen and
Kevin Murphy which called for companies to tie their executives' pay to
objective benchmarks. 39 A few years later in 1993, the federal tax laws
were amended to incentivize corporations to achieve this result.4' The
amended tax provisions provide that corporations cannot deduct as a
business expense compensation paid to an executive in excess of one
million dollars, unless, inter alia, the compensation is linked to an
objective metric of corporate performance. 41 The 1993 amendment
caused a major shift in compensation practices. Prior to 1993,
corporations mostly compensated executives with fixed salaries and
discretionary bonuses. 42 Following the change in the tax code,
companies began to limit the salary portion to one million dollars, but
increased the incentive pay.43 Interestingly, immediately after the tax
amendments went into effect, the percentage of CEO compensation
attributable to incentive pay was only thirty-five percent.44 Today, this
figure is estimated to be close to eighty-five percent.45
The 1993 tax amendments provided a tepid response to the growing
concerns that executives were extracting more than their fair share from
the firms that employed them. In 2001, these concerns of corporate greed
36. Executive Perquisites, CENTER ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION,
http://www.execcomp.org/basics/basicsperqs.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
37. See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin, Shareholders Hit the Roof over Relocation Subsidies, WALL ST.
J., Oct 25, 2010, at B I (describing how activist investors are "turning up the heat on companies that
give relocating executives generous benefits to cover the cost of their depressed home values").
38. See Executive Perquisites, supra note 36.
39. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 5, at 139-40.
40. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006); Base Salary, CENTER ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION,
http://www.execcomp.org/basics/basics base.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
41. See I.R.C. § 162(m).
42. Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or
Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 147 tbl.2 (2000).
43. Base Salary, supra note 40; see Perry & Zenner, supra note 42, at 147 tbl.2.
44. See Perry & Zenner, supra note 42, at 147 tbl.2 (reporting that in 1993 bonus
compensation accounted for 20.07% and options compensation accounted for 14.99%, totaling 35%
in incentive pay).
45. Basics, supra note 26.
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and deceit were brought into sharp focus with the public collapses of
Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing. Academic and policy discourse
on executive compensation significantly increased, and the concept of
PFP which had been floated since the early 1980s was revisited with
new vigor.
In 2002, Professors Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker put forth a
managerial power theory of executive compensation,46 which has since
become the dominant conception of executive compensation and PFP.
They argued that even though incentive pay structures had been adopted,
executive compensation contracts reflected rent extraction rather than
optimal contracting.47 They further argued that the evidence revealed
that executive compensation contracts were not being designed to
minimize agency costs (the optimal contracting view), but rather they
were the result of rent extraction.48 Meanwhile, Bebchuk et al. contended
that the evidence suggested that there was no arm's length bargaining;
no market constraints to induce players to adopt optimal compensation
contracts; and that courts did not prove effective in correcting or
guarding against these bloated compensation packages.49
Their prescription was that pay should be more closely tied to
performance and that care should be taken in compensation design to
minimize, or where possible, eliminate payments that were merely
gratuitous and had nothing to do with executive performance. 0 These
included the elimination of non-indexed or non-benchmarked options (to
avoid windfall from general rises in the market); the elimination of at-the
money options (options priced so that at the time of issuance they are in
the money); the elimination of the practice of option-repricing and
issuing reloadable options; and the preference for long-term incentives
over short-term incentives. 1
Many aspects of the managerial power approach have either been
formally implemented into law or have become de facto law through
their repeated use in executive compensation discourse and policy. For
example, it is now common practice to index all options granted to
executives to some predetermined metric. Similarly, compensation
consultants often advise, and proxy advisors often insist, that companies
tie a significant portion of an executive's pay to some predefined and yet
46. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 784-85 (2002).
47. Id. at 793.
48. See id
49. Id. at 774, 779.
50. See id. at 798.
51. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4, at 164-67, 183-84; Bebchuk et al., supra note 46, at
798, 809-10, 819-20, 832-33.
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to be realized metric. 52 In terms of formal law, in 2006 the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") amended its rules to
require additional disclosure of executive and director compensation.
53
The amendments refined the then-required tabular disclosure by
requiring that this tabular disclosure be combined with improved
narrative disclosure to be contained in a new Compensation Discussion
and Analysis section (the "CD&A")-the aim being, "to elicit clearer
and more complete disclosure of compensation of the principal executive
officer, principal financial officer, the three other highest paid executive
officers and the directors. 54 In addition, in 2009 and 2010, respectively,
the NYSE and NASDAQ changed their listing standards and required
that members of the board compensation committee be independent-a
change which responded to Bebchuk et al.'s critique that there was no
arm's length bargaining between the board and top executives.55
It was the 2008 financial crisis, however, that brought the executive
compensation debate out of primarily academic and policy circles and
into the public debate, and renewed the managerial power view that there
was rampant corporate greed. If the 2001 corporate failures of Enron and
WorldCom fanned the flame, the 2008 financial crisis ignited it. The
debate over the appropriateness of executive compensation became part
of the public discourse and was no longer confined to academic and
policy circles. The so-called "Occupy Wall Street Movement" latched
onto executive compensation as a mobilizing force and used it as an
example of the widening disparity between the so-called "One Percent"
52. See, e.g., GARY HEWITT & CAROL BOWIE, INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS., INC.,
EVALUATING PAY FOR PERFORMANCE ALIGNMENT: ISS' QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE
APPROACH (describing the types of metrics and PFP structures that Institutional Shareholder
Services, Inc. ("ISS"), one of the leading proxy advisors, will deem to reflect sound corporate
governance, and which will in turn affect whether ISS recommends that shareholders vote in favor
of a company's compensation package); Pay for Performance, GLASS, LEWIS & CO.,
http://www.glasslewis.comldownloads/policies/Pay-For-PerformanceDescription.pdf (last visited
Feb. 7, 2013) ("[C]ompensation practices should align management's interests with those of
shareholders. Thus, [we] believe that executive compensation should be closely tied to company and
stock performance."); see also Pay-jbr-Performance Analytics, EQUILAR, http://www.equilar.com
/govemance-center/TSR-CEO-pay-modeler.php (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) ("[I]t is imperative for
companies and investors to understand, measure, and communicate the relationship between
executive compensation and long-term shareholder value creation.... [C]ompanies need to
accurately and consistently measure CEO compensation and company performance for both their
company and all of their peers.").
53. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to Disclosure Requirements
Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Matters (July 26, 2006) [hereinafter Disclosure
Requirements], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm.
54. Id.
55. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.05 (2013); NASDAQ STOCK
MKT., NASDAQ MANUAL § 5605(d)(2) (2013); Bebchuk et al., supra note 46, at 766, 774, 784-85;
see also BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4, at 24-25.
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and "Ninety-Nine Percent., 56 The Oval Office jumped into the fray with
President Barack Obama repeatedly referring to Wall Street executives
as "Wall Street fat cats"-alluding to the belief that executives were
greedy and earning much more than was commensurate with their labor
and effort." Congress responded in 2010 by passing the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank"), 58
which contains several provisions related to executive compensation,
including requirements that public company shareholders be given a
non-binding vote on executive pay (so-called "say on pay").59 Finally,
Dodd-Frank contains an additional set of executive compensation
disclosure requirements, now known as the "Enhanced CD&A," that
require public corporations to disclose whether, and if so how their
compensation policies take into account the result of any say on
pay votes.6°
3. The Advantages and Limitations of an Economic Conception of
PFP
The main advantage of the managerial power approach to executive
compensation is that it provides a tractable theory that can be
operationalized relatively easily. This is because the managerial power
approach is solely focused on the economics of the relationship between
how much an executive earns and how that executive's firm performs.
The second advantage is that the managerial power approach fits neatly
within the traditional economic and financial perspectives that have long
dominated corporate law. Thus its framing of, and prescription for,
executive compensation as an economic one, received (at least initially)
less push back from corporate law scholars, and the approach
significantly influenced SEC rulemaking, the market and shareholders'
56. The 99 Percent Project, OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://www.occupywallst.org/article/
99Percent/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
57. In a 2009 interview broadcast, President Barack Obama blasted banking executives for
having paid themselves multi-million dollar bonuses after receiving federal bailout money and
stated, "I did not run for office to be helping out a bunch of, you know, fat-cat bankers on Wall
Street." David Jackson, Obama: 'Fat Cat Bankers Owe Help to U.S. Taxpayers, USA TODAY, Dec.
14, 2009, at 7A; see also Kevin Roose, Bonuses Dip on Wall St., but Far Less Than Earnings, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 29, 2012, 8:48 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/29/as-bank-
profits-plunge-wall-street-bonuses-fall-modestly (stating that "Wall Street continues to be a
lightning rod for politicians and critics who contend that the industry's pay packages are too high").
58. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
the U.S.C.).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (Supp. IV 2011).
60. Id.; see Scott Hirst, SEC Issues Proposed Rules on Say-on-Pay Voting and
Disclosures, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOv. & FIN. REG. (Nov. 11, 2012, 9:56 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/1 1/1I1/sec-issues-proposed-rules-on-say-on-pay-voting-
and-disclosures.
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conception of executive compensation, and the design of executive
compensation packages.
Despite the neat tractability of the managerial power approach to
PFP, the fundamental question remains as to whether this purely
economic approach to PFP either works and/or is sustainable. With
respect to instances of pay being insensitive to performance, the
managerial power response is to focus on the economic design of the
PFP package. Consider, however, that despite having lived through
almost two decades of tinkering with the economic design of PFP to
achieve the right model to incentivize executives to act in the long term
interest of the firm, and that currently over eighty-five percent of all
public companies have implemented a PFP model, stories continue to
abound of pay being decoupled from performance.61
It is time for us to consider whether the answer lies beyond the
economics. For starters, a macro shift to a PFP model seems to have
actually increased the ratio of CEO pay to that of the average American
worker. In 1991, two years before the adoption of the tax amendments
which caused the push towards PFP adoption, the average American
CEO of a large public company received pay approximately 140 times
that of the average employee; ten years after the tax amendments, the
ratio was approximately 500 times; and today, after further tinkering and
refinement of the PFP structure, that ratio is approximately 300 times.
62
Consider further that Lehman Brothers, AIG, Countrywide, Enron,
WorldCom, and Global Crossing all had PFP programs in place at the
time of their respective demise. In addition, we now have more
meaningful transparency and accountability as a result of the SEC's
Enhanced CD&A rules and say on pay, yet concerns about whether our
system of executive compensation actually motivates executives to act in
the long term best interests of the corporation and its shareholders
still remain.
The evidence on the ground indicates that in many ways pay
remains insensitive to performance, even in the face of careful economic
tinkering, transparency, and accountability. In addition, the flip side of
pay insensitivity is that if one adopts a purely economic conception of
"performance" then even though pay sensitivity increases, so could
several of the greedy and reckless tendencies that PFP tries to
discourage. A 2010 report prepared for a Morgan Stanley publication
(the "Morgan Stanley report") highlighted this concern, stating that
61. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4, at 121-22, 135-36; Basics, supra note 26.
62. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4, at 1; Mike Spector & Tom McGinty, The CEO
Bankruptcy Bonus, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2012, at Al.
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while "[p]ay-for-performance sensitivity has significantly increased over
time, improving the alignment of CEOs with shareholders, . . . [PFP]
also appears to have had unintended consequences," including the
manipulation of earnings, the externalization of risks, and the use of
aggressive accounting practices to inflate a company's stock price.
6 3
The 2008 financial crisis was a wakeup call that the current
economic focus of PFP needs to be re-evaluated. In other sectors such as
healthcare and education, the value of PFP is now being questioned.64
Understandably, implementing performance-based pay in the education
setting may lead to increased performance of students in the classroom,
but may also lead to undesired effects such as teachers directing their
efforts solely towards these monetary rewards and "teaching to the
test. 65 Similarly, a recent study on performance-based pay in the
medical field found that problems arose due to the collaborative effort
often needed to treat a patient effectively and achieve quality patient
care. 66 And closer afield in the corporate world, there are the beginnings
of empirical evidence offering good reason for skepticism about the
promise of PFP in the executive compensation space. For example, a
2011 study concluded that their empirical findings challenge the
"popular belief' that executive stock options can be used to incentivize
risk averse CEOs to overcome their aversion and invest in risky projects,
which do in fact generate positive net present values.67
PFP as a sustainable and reliable model for executive compensation
is at a crossroads--either continue to focus solely on the economics,
which thus far has yielded questionable results, or expand its perspective
to incorporate learning from other fields that directly speak to the
concern of PFP-motivating executives to do good for the firm and its
shareholders while being paid commensurately. To truly reach its goal of
incentivizing executives to act in the long-term interests of the firm and
its shareholders, the current PFP model must be willing to look beyond
the confines of financial and economic theory and consider how people
are actually motivated, and how they make judgments that require
63. See Faulkender et al., supra note 1, at 113-14, 117.
64. See, e.g., Julia James, Pay-for-Performance, HEALTH POL'Y BRIEF 3-4 (Dec. 20, 2012),
available at http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief-pdfs/heathpolicybrief 78.pdf; see
also Victor Lavy, Using Performance-Based Pay to Improve the Quality of Teachers, 17 FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 87, 88 (2007).
65. See, e.g., Stephenie Overman, Fighting the Stress of Teaching to the Test, NAT'L EDUC.
ASS'N, http://www.nea.org/tools/fighting-stress-teaching-to-Test.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
66. See James C. Robinson et al., Quality-Based Payment for Medical Groups and Individual
Physicians, INQUIRY J., Summer 2009, at 172, 177-79.
67. See Christopher S. Armstrong & Rahul Vashishtha, Executive Stock Options, Differential
Risk- Taking Incentives, and Firm Value, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 70, 72-73 (2011).
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decisions about a time in the future. By necessity, this consideration
must entail wrestling with the behavioral dynamics that impact how
people make decisions under uncertainty and how they are motivated. To
proceed as if executives are "ontological actors, frozen in space and time
and isolated from social and cultural context," is to settle for less than
the best result for the promise of PFP.68
III. INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIORAL LITERATURE THAT
IMPACT THE PFP MODEL
The concern about how best to structure executive compensation is
one that is particularly suited to a behavioral analysis because it is a
fundamental concern about how best to motivate human beings to
undertake some desired behavior-in the case of PFP, to make decisions
69in the best interests of the corporation.
Behavioral theories have been applied in other areas such as public
health, tobacco litigation, antitrust, and tax reform, to enhance the
probability of achieving the desired result. For example, in the area of
public health, health officials used findings from social theory
interaction to design programs to lessen the occurrence of HIV-related
sexual risk behaviors.70 Similarly, in the area of antitrust, competition
authorities in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European
Commission have all openly acknowledged the benefits to be gained by
employing behavioral science theories in the design and implementation
of antitrust programs. 7! In legal academia, the use of behavioral science
can be found in the works of Professors Sunstein, Jolls, and Stout to
name a few.72 Probably most telling of the increasing traction of
68. R.V. Aguilera & G. Jackson, The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance:
Dimensions and Determinants, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 447, 449 (2003).
69. Behavioral science is divided into two broad categories-neural (decision) science and
social (communication) science. This Article is primarily concerned with the former category.
Decision science encompasses those disciplines that are primarily concerned with the decision
processes and individual functioning employed by the particular subject in a social environment.
Examples of disciplines that fall within the decision science branch are psychology, organization
theory, cognitive science, and social neuroscience.
70. See Karen Glanz & Donald B. Bishop, The Role of Behavioral Science Theory in
Development and Implementation of Public Health Interventions, 31 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH,
2010, at 399; see also PROGRAM EVALUATION UNIT, N.Y. CITY. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND MENTAL
HYGIENE, UsING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE: APPLYING THEORY TO PRACTICE, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/htmVdoh/downloads/pdf/dires/epi-ispres-behavsci200
2l 2O 3 .pdf.
71. See Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527,
1530-31 (2011).
72. See generally, e.g., Christine Jolls, et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Some Effects of Moral Indignation on Law, 33 VT.
L. REV. 405 (2009); Lynn A. Stout, Other-Regarding Preferences and Social Norms (Georgetown
Univ. Law Center 2001 Working Paper Series in Bus., Econ., and Regulatory Policy and Pub. Law
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behavioral science in the law, is that once staunch defenders of economic
theory of rational choice and utility have now begun to question the
utility (no pun intended) of that theory in light of the 2008 financial
crisis, and have begun to acknowledge that behavioral analysis offers
useful insight into actual human behavior.73
A. The Optimal Length of Contracts
As discussed in Part II, approximately eighty-five percent of an
executive's compensation is determined using a PFP model.74 A majority
of that eighty-five percent is in the form of long-term incentives, the
most common forms being stock options, restricted stock, performance
shares, and performance-vested stock options.75 "Long-term" in this
context typically means anywhere from three to five years, but the
optimal length of a compensation contract is still the source of much
debate. Compensation consultants and industry experts often design their
valuation models around a three to five year time frame.76 Some
academics view the optimal length as being between two to four years,
and still other academics have pointed out that a time horizon of three to
five years may not be "long-term" enough because it may allow
executives to reap the rewards for their decisions before the full effects
of those decisions are realized.77
Considerations that influence the determination of the optimal time
frame for executive compensation contracts include tax rules, accounting
standards, the nature of the industry in which the firm operates (for
example, firms involved in industries with intensive research and
development tend to adopt longer time frames), the timing of projects,
and economic calculations of the cost to shareholders of promising a
given reward.78
Yet another consideration in choosing an appropriate time frame
should be how the choice of time frame affects the value that an
executive attaches to the promised reward. In the behavioral literature,
& Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 265902, Mar. 2001).
73. See generally, e.g., Richard A. Posner, On the Receipt of the Ronald H. Coase Medal:
Uncertainty, the Economic Crisis, and the Future of Law and Economics, 12 Am. L. & ECON. REV.
265 (2010) (discussing the applicability of behavioral economics in light of the 2008 financial
crisis).
74. See supra text accompanying note 45.
75. Long-Term Incentive, supra note 29.
76. See, e.g., MERIDIAN, 2012 TRENDS, supra note 23, at 20.
77. See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and
Committing to the Long-term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 369 (2009); see also Alex Edmans et al.,
Dynamic CEO Compensation, 67 J. FIN. 1603, 1631-32 (2012).
78. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 46, at 826-28.
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studies on hyperbolic discounting and the variability of discount rates are
particularly useful in this regard.
1. Hyperbolic Discounting
"Hyperbolic discounting" refers to the idea that "real
people ... give more weight to events that are very immediate or very
distant in time, and less weight" to events that occur at an "intermediate"
time.79 This stands in contrast with most economic thinking, which
supposes that people value the present versus the future by using an
exponential discounting function-meaning that the value a person
attaches to a future reward decreases per unit of delay, regardless of the
total length of delay. 80 Both the traditional economic view and the
behavioral view agree that all things being equal, people prefer rewards
sooner rather than later.81 Where they differ, is that the classical
economic view assumes that people's degree of preference for the future
reward remains constant over time, while behavioral studies have found
that this is in fact not the case.82
To illustrate, in a 1981 study, Professor Richard Thaler asked
subjects to indicate the amount of money they would demand over
various time frames of one month, one year, and ten years, respectively,
to make them indifferent to receiving $15 immediately.83 The median
responses were $20, $50, $100, respectively, implying an average
discount rate of 345% over a one-month time horizon, 120% over a one-
year time horizon, and 19% over a 10-year time horizon.8 4 Several
subsequent studies have produced similar results.
8 5
79. See J. Doyne Farmer & John Geanakoplos, Hyperbolic Discounting Is Rational: Valuing
the Far Future with Uncertain Discount Rates 2 (Cowles Found. Discussion Paper No. 1719, 2009),
available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/dl7a/dl719.pdf.
80. See id. at 1-2.
81. See Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on Measurement of Utility, 4 REV. ECON. STUD. 155, 155-
59 (1937) (describing the economic view of intertemporal decision-making); see also Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 5, at 322-24; Kris N. Kirby et al., Correlates of Delay-Discount Rates:
Evidence from Tsimane' Amerindians of the Bolivian Rain Forest, 23 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 291, 292
(2002) (describing the behavioral science view of intertemporal decision-making); Marc Wittmann
& Martin P. Paulus, Temporal Horizons in Decision Making, 2 J. NEUROSCIENCE, PSYCHOL., &
ECON. 1, 1 (2009).
82. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 72, at 1539; see also Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin,
Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REv. 103, 103, 105-06 (1999); Samuelson, supra note 81, at
156; Richard Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETrERS 201,
204-05 (1981).
83. Thaler, supra note 82, at 203 & tbl.1.
84. Id. at 203, 204 tbl.2.
85. See, e.g., Phillip Streich & Jack S. Levy, Time Horizons, Discounting and Intertemporal
Choice, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 199, 204-05 (2007).
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According to Professors Streich and Levy what the studies reveal
is that:
The greater the delay between the present (the time of decision) and the
point at which the payoff occurs, the lower the discount rate, and
hence, the greater the discount factor and the relative weight attached
to the outcome. What this means is that the discount function flattens
out more than the [traditional economic] model predicts. People are
more patient for more temporally distant rewards, relative to those who
engage in constant-rate discounting, and they will accept a
disproportionately lower amount of compensation for longer delays for
forgoing a reward in the present.86
Although there is a substantial body of evidence that suggests that
humans are "better described as hyperbolic discounters," the
conventional economic model has been slow to incorporate this
87learning. In the executive compensation sphere, compensation models
are often based on this conventional economic model and thus also
assume, what behavioral findings will tell us, is an inaccurate descriptor
of how people actually value future rewards. 88 For example, in valuing
stock options (which, as discussed in Part II, constitute a key part of
incentive compensation and the PFP model), practitioners and academics
often use standard option-pricing formulas, such as Black-Scholes which
assume exponential discounting, to estimate the cost of the option to the
firm and its shareholders, and the value of the option to the executive.89
Incorporating behavioral leamings on hyperbolic discounting into
the debate on the optimal length of executive compensation contracts
offers at least three insights. First, it signals that there is some
intermediate time frame, that is the optimal time frame for motivating
executives to achieve a given reward. Determining what this
intermediate time frame is could well prove to be a fruitful area for
additional empirical work on the optimal time frame for compensation
contracts. Second, it signals that beyond this intermediate time frame the
relative weight attached to the potential for earning a given reward
becomes so low that the reward actually may not serve an incentivizing
86. Id. at 204 (citations omitted).
87. See Farmer & Geanakoplos, supra note 79, at 2; see also David I. Laibson, Hyperbolic
Discount Functions, Undersaving, and Savings Policy 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper 5635, 1996), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5635.pdf ("Despite the
availability of [a hyperbolic discounting] analytic framework, and the substantial body of evidence
supporting hyperbolic discounting, few economists have studied the implications of hyperbolic
discount functions.").
88. See Laibson, supra note 87, at 2-4.
89. See Brian Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 3, 6-8 (2002).
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function for the executive-a result which would of course significantly
undercut the objectives of PFP. Third, when compensation committees
and compensation consultants assume a conventional economic model
for valuation of a future reward, if their assumed time frame falls beyond
the intermediate time frame that hyperbolic discounting would predict,
they may unwittingly over-estimate the value an executive would
actually require to be incentivized to achieve results over the defined
time period, and thus may over-compensate the executive.
2. The Variability of Discount Rate
While studies on hyperbolic discounting point to the need to
consider that the value of a future reward to an executive is not only
affected by absolute lengths of time but also by relative lengths of time,
studies on the variability of discount rate examine how various
behavioral dynamics affect the actual discount rate that people employ to
value temporally distant rewards. For example, in a study examining the
relationships between individual discount rates and various
socioeconomic and demographic variables, researchers found that
discount rates increased with age, decreased with educational levels, and
literacy, and decreased as recent income rose.90 Similarly, a 2009 study
concluded that people's "subjective experience" of time affects the
discount rate that individuals employ when valuing future rewards.
91
While executives may exhibit more financial savvy and rationality in
determining discount rates relative to the general population, an
understanding of how people generally select individual discount rates
can yield insight into the type of behavioral dynamics that may impact a
given executive's discount rate at a given firm.
Research examining the causal relationship between decision
making and perception of time shows that time is experienced
subjectively and that people make decisions in time units, with time units
based on a circadian clock (roughly one day) and a circa-annual clock
(roughly one year) being the most relevant in decisions related to long-
term planning.92 Moreover, studies plotting discount rates for monetary
rewards against time horizons show that discount rates are consistently
high for delays up to one year and that there is little or no decline of
discount rates was visible between one year and ten years.
To illustrate, consider a study of lottery winners in several states
that focused on whether winners chose the smaller immediate cash
90. See Kirby et al., supra note 81, at 306-08, 310.
91. Wittmann & Paulus, supra note 81, at 3-4.
92. See id. at 5-6.
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option or the larger delayed annuity option. The study found that at the
time the ticket was purchased, more people indicated a preference for the
cash option over the annuity option should they win, which tended to
show that people were discounting the annuity option more because it
was both improbable and delayed relative to the cash option.93 These
findings demonstrate that the discount rate used by individuals to value
future rewards is highly personal, subjective, dynamic, and inconsistent
for any given reward and at any given point in time.
At least four implications for executive compensation design follow
from these findings. First, these findings strongly support the intuition
that PFP design should not be homogenous across executives. As
discussed above, various endogenous and exogenous factors affect how
individuals value the promise of future rewards, and the discount factor
that one employs to value a future reward is dynamic and dependent on a
host of both intrinsic and extrinsic factors. While homogeneity is not
required by law, the PFP model has in many ways been used to force
homogenization of executive compensation design, most notably in the
selection of compensation mix (discussed above in Part II.A) and in the
definition of performance. 94 In addition, homogenization can be seen in
proxy advisor reports on how PFP should be structured, compensation
consultant reports, the academic literature, and the constant demand
from shareholders to homogenize around a PFP template.95 While factors
such as firm size and industry are often taken into account, boards
should be allowed much more latitude in structuring the ideal
compensation package as they deem fit for their CEO and other top
executives. An innovative biotech start-up, for example, may not have
the same PFP goals as a mature manufacturer of photocopying machines.
Similarly, a company like Facebook whose CEO is the founder and chief
creator, may not need to rely on a PFP model to incentivize the executive
to achieve long-term firm growth and value. As one CEO put it, "[i]t's a
93. See Forest Baker et al., Decision-Making in State Lotteries: Haif Now or All of It Later, 10
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 965, 966, 969 & tbl. 1 (2003).
94. Some homogenization is the result of tax and accounting rules. For an overview of these
rules and their effects on executive compensation design, see Walker, supra note 24, at 238-40.
95. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4, at 19, 135; HEWITr & BOWIE, supra note 52,
4-6 (describing the types of metrics and PFP structures that ISS will deem to reflect sound corporate
governance, and which will in turn affect whether ISS recommends that shareholders vote in favor
of a company's compensation package); Bebchuk et al., supra note 46, at 817-20; Equilar Insight
Product Suite, EQUILAR, http://www.equilar.com/pdfs/equilar-insight-product-suite.pdf (last visited
Feb. 7, 2013); see also Pay for Performance, supra note 52 ("In [our] opinion, compensation
practices should align management's interests with those of shareholders. We believe that executive
compensation should be closely tied to company and stock performance."); Work Value, HAY
GROUP, http://www.haygroup.com/au/services/index.aspx?id=30373 (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
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cookie-cutter world for evaluating executive pay. But we're not
a cookie. 96
A related doctrinal point is that homogenization of PFP formulation
in executive compensation contracts actually increases the burden on
any shareholder who seeks to challenge the compensation arrangements
in court. This is because the standard by which courts judge the validity
of executive compensation contracts is the standard of "waste"-i.e., the
contract was so one-sided that no reasonable person of "sound judgment
could [have] conclude[d] that the corporation has received" any
benefit.97 One of the elements that the shareholder has to show to
successfully prove waste is that no reasonable person would have
approved the agreement. The more homogenized executive
compensation becomes, the more difficult it is to meet this waste
standard.
98
The second implication is that for "long term" incentives to truly
work, the executive must be operating within a cultural and situational
framework that does in fact encourage a focus on the long-term. As
Professor Jay Lorsch aptly noted, "[o]rganizational relationships are not
merely transactional and fleeting. Over time, they become imbued with
affect, content, norms, values, culture, and meaning." 99 The actual
cultural and situational framework within which executives operate,
however, exhibits a high degree of short-termism, which does not
encourage a long-term perception of time. Examples of short-termism
behavior in today's corporate world include shareholders' insistence that
management deliver quarterly growth, the practice of compensating
executives based on stock price or current year earnings, and the practice
of weekly analyst calls.100 Thus, there seems to be an incongruence
between the markets' and shareholders' short-term perception of time on
the one hand, and the long-term perception of time that PFP attempts to
inculcate, on the other. This disconnect in time perception would point to
the potential for executives under-valuing future rewards because they
96. Craig Mellow, The Optices of CEO Pay, CORP. BOARD MEMBER, First Quarter 2002, at
37-38 (quoting Ronald "Rocky" Robins, Jr., general counsel of Abercrombie & Fitch).
97. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006).
98. Cf id.
99. Jay Lorsch & Rakesh Khurana, The Pay Problem: Time for a New Paradigm for
Executive Compensation, HARV. MAO., May-June 2010, at 35.
100. If the efficient market hypothesis ("EMH") holds true and the stock price fully reflects all
available information in the market, including the long-term prospects of the firm, then
compensating executives based on stock price would arguably not encourage short-termism.
However, this is a contentious question which is beyond the scope of this paper. There is, however,
a vast body of academic literature which suggests that markets often violate the EMH.
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are operating within a cultural framework that rhetorically values the
long-term, but in fact places a high premium on the short-term.' 01
Third, evidence that people discount the value of a future reward
more if the reward is both too distant and too improbable, would suggest
that to the extent we increase the time span of PFP compensation as has
been suggested, we should think of ways to reduce the improbability of
the future reward. 10 2 One way to achieve this would be to switch from
the current "pay opportunity" model to a "realizable pay" standard.'0 3
The pay opportunity model is the standard way of valuing long-term
incentives. 10 4 It reflects how much the executive has the opportunity of
earning, which often times has no bearing on what the executive actually
earns.' O5 As a leading compensation scholar put it, valuing long-term
incentives this way is a "wild-a** guess" about what the executive will
actually earn-i.e., it is highly improbable. 10 6 Behavioral findings would
point to lessening this improbability, which could be achieved by
switching to a realizable pay model, which unlike pay opportunity,
attempts to calculate how much the executive actually stands to earn.
Fourth, behavioral insights on the dynamics that affect one's
discount rates could be used by practitioners to model for individual
traits and thus better approximate how much value a particular executive
attaches to a given reward or series of rewards. This would be similar to
what is already being done in compensation valuation models that
attempt to account for employee characteristics. 10 7 The most frequently
modeled-for individual trait is risk aversion, thus recognizing that
executives vary in their level of risk aversion and that a more risk averse
executive will discount uncertain future returns more than another
executive with less risk aversion. Similarly, another individual factor
that models account for is the alternative investments of the executive.
The behavioral literature overwhelmingly presents the case for going
further and accounting for other individual traits such as levels of wealth
and prior levels of income.
10 8
101. Cultivating a cultural framework that encourages a long run perception of time also links
to discussions in the literature on the need to encourage "patient capital." Patient capital is another
name for long-term capital, and it is traditionally used to refer to an investor's willingness to invest
with an eye towards the long-term sustainability and value creation of the firm with no expectation
of an immediate reward. See, e.g., Patient Capital, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2007, at 84, 86.
102. See, e.g., Edmans et al., supra note 77, at 1621-23 (describing the use of escrow accounts
and calling for increasing vesting periods).
103. Mellow, supra note 96, at 40.
104. See id. at 41.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 24, at 241.
108. One interesting wrinkle is that while the behavioral literature often lists age as a factor that
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B. The Optimal Compensation Mix
Yet another area where behavioral findings can be useful is in the
substantive structure of compensation contracts. As discussed in Part II,
the typical compensation mix includes a combination of cash salary;
annual bonuses; long-term incentives in the form of stock options,
restricted stock, performance shares and performance-vested stock
options; severance or change in control payments; employee benefits;
and various perquisites. Compensation committees and their consultants
are tasked with designing executive compensation contracts that
simultaneously serve the goals of the company and serve to motivate the
executives to undertake actions that will help the company realize these
goals. 10 9 One challenge for the compensation committee in designing
these contracts is how to choose between the different forms of
compensation. t10 For a given firm, how should the compensation
committee and/or consultant determine whether to award restricted
stock, performance shares, or options? The answer to this question often
starts by employing economic analysis in an attempt to ascertain the
value of each component and then the values are summed."' Scholars
have also attempted to account for various individual employee
characteristics such as loss aversion, effort aversion, and outside
investment opportunities that affect how the rewards may be valued.' 2
Closer afield to this Article's behavioral inquiry, are considerations
on the ways in which prospect theory and the sequencing effect have
decision-making implications on the choice of compensation mix.
1. Prospect Theory
Several studies have found that after some large dollar amount, the
slope of the value function would flatten out and begin to approach zero
(often termed diminishing marginal utility).113  Noted behavioral
could affect discount rates, building age into a compensation model would run afoul of several
federal and state laws prohibiting compensation discrimination based on age.
109. See, e.g., MERIDIAN, 2012 TRENDS, supra note 23, at 15, 18, 21.
110. Seeid.
111. See generally Lambert et al., supra note 7.
112. See, e.g., Ingolf Dittmann & Ernst Maug, Lower Salaries and No Options? On the
Optimal Structure of Executive Pay, 62 J. FIN. 303, 308-10 (2007); Anna Dodonova & Yuri
Khoroshilov, Optimal Incentive Contracts for Loss-Averse Managers: Stock Options Versus
Restricted Stock Grants, 41 FIN. REV. 451, 460-64 (2006); Oded Palmon et al., Optimal Strike
Prices of Stock Options for Effort-Averse Executives, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 229, 230, 233-37
(2008); Gerald A. Feltham & Martin G.H. Wu, Incentive Efficiency of Stock Versus Options, 6 REV.
AcCT. STUDIES 7, 11-18 (2001); Yisong S. Tian, Optimal Contracting, Incentive Effects and the
Valuation of Executive Stock Options 22, 24-28 (Apr. 30, 2001) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=268738.
113. See, e.g., George F. Loewenstein & Dra2en Prelec, Preferences for Sequences of
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economics scholar, Richard Thaler, observed that people displayed
diminishing sensitivity over larger amounts.11 4 Thus, the percentage
increase in value as one goes from 30 million to 60 million dollars,
would be less than the percent increase as one goes from 3 million to 10
million dollars. At lower amounts people are more sensitive to the
promise of future rewards, but there is a threshold amount at which
marginal returns diminish and their sensitivity to promised future
rewards begins to flatten and decline."l 5
This finding has important implications in executive compensation
design for two reasons. First, many CEOs and top executives fall into the
top one percent of wage earners in the United States and many are
generally considered wealthy even before they become CEOs.1 16
Based on the findings of diminished marginal utility, this means that
many CEOs and top executives may have diminished sensitivity at
the outset of contract negotiation and thus are less sensitive to
compensation incentives.
Second, even for those executives who do not start off wealthy, the
more financial incentives they are offered, the more they stand to earn
and actually do earn, and the less sensitive they become to these
financial incentives in successive rounds of compensation design. For
PFP, this presents an obvious problem-diminishing marginal utility
would suggest that high powered financial incentives may not actually
incentivize executives to undertake the desired behavior because their
existing positions of wealth make them less sensitive to promises of
more monetary award.117 However, a related problem may be that at
larger compensation amounts the diminishing marginal utility curve
flattens out, thus decreasing risk aversion. This in turn could decrease
the executive's incentive to avoid decisions that present a high degree of
risk to the firm, but which present very little financial risk to
the executive.
A related factor that further weakens attempts to incentivize
executives by linking their pay to their firm's economic performance is
that executives are able to offset any equity compensation risks by
Outcomes, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 91, 91 (1993).
114. Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING
183, 185 (1999).
115. Seeid.
116. See SANFORD C. BERNSTEIN & CO. EMBA STUDENT LEADERSHIP & ETHICS BD.,
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: How DOES PAY INFLUENCE DECISIONS AND GOVERNANCE? 2,
available at http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/rt/null?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file-id=7217623
&rtcontentdisposition=filename%3Dbemstein-exec-comp-whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION].
117. Seeid.at2-3.
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utilizing various hedging instruments, further reducing their sensitivity
to offered incentives. 1 8 Thus, even though a firm may have negotiated a
contract which facially reflects tying pay to performance and hence
signaling the alignment of interest and reduction in agency costs, if we
account for diminished marginal utility and the fact that executives are
able to hedge their risks, the contract may in fact not serve an
incentivizing function.
As developed in Part IV, behavioral findings on diminished
marginal utility would tend to indicate the need for compensation design
to put less reliance on high powered financial rewards as the primary
way to motivate senior executives to act in the long-term interests of the
firm. In addition, diminished marginal utility literature would suggest
that in structuring the optimal compensation mix, attention should be
paid to the incremental effect of each element of compensation in
motivating the executive, and not just on the effect of the compensation
mix as a whole. t 9
2. Sequencing Effect
In addition to determining the substantive make-up of a
compensation package, the compensation committee must also
determine how to spread potential rewards over the life of the contract.
Behavioral studies on the sequencing effect are particularly helpful in
this regard. "Sequencing effect" captures the idea that while, all things
being equal, individuals prefer to receive something of value sooner
rather than later, there is also evidence that when people view outcomes
as part of a sequence they prefer that the value of these outcomes
improve over time.1 20 Thus, when choosing between outcomes that are
spaced over a period of time, whether people exhibit negative time
preference (i.e., they prefer an improving sequence of events, all other
things being equal) or positive time preference (i.e., they prefer to
receive things sooner rather than later) "depends on whether a particular
choice is viewed by the decision maker as being embedded in a sequence
of outcomes."
t 21
The sequencing effect, for example, would predict that the typical
law student would prefer to see an improvement in grades from 1 L year
118. Seeid. at2.
119. Several studies have measured the incentive effects of a given compensation contract by
looking at the total compensation tied to the given performance variable. See, e.g., Lambert et al.,
supra note 7, at 139 ("A number of studies ... have measured the magnitude of the manager's
incentive to affect a performance variable P by calculating the percentage of his total compensation
tied to P.").
120. See Loewenstein & Prelec, supra note 113, at 91.
121. Id.
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to 3L year (e.g., going from a B average to an A average), rather than
earn all As IL year, followed by all A-minuses 2L year, and all Bs 3L
year, even if we assumed the cumulative GPA would be the same in
all scenarios.
A number of studies have been conducted which support this theory
and show that people generally prefer improving their outcome over
time. 1 22 One such study in 1991 found that a majority of those
interviewed preferred a wage profile that started low and increased over
time, to a wage profile that started high and declined or plateaued over
time for an identical job. 123 In another study, participants were presented
with a series of hypothetical choices between sequences that ended with
a loss (for example, win $10, then lose $5) or a gain (lose $5, then gain
$10).124 Participants overwhelmingly preferred the sequences that ended
with a gain. 2 5
Whether a decision-maker views a choice as isolated or as part of a
sequence is affected by factors such as how the choice is framed,
whether the outcomes are commensurate, and the length of the delay
between outcomes. In general when outcomes are commensurable and
concurrent, people are more likely to treat the outcomes as part of a
sequence. Durations of intervals, how intervals are marked, and how the
choices are conveyed will all have an impact on whether the decision-
maker views a series of choices as being part of a sequence. The more a
series of choices is viewed as part of a sequence, the greater the chance
that the decision-maker will want to improve his or her outcomes over
time rather than opt to receive rewards immediately. As noted by
Professors Loewenstein and Prelec, "when the decision frame draws
attention to the sequential nature of choice, negative time discounting
typically prevails; however, when the frame draws attention to individual
components of the choice, positive time preference predominates.12 6
Even assuming that a decision-maker views a series of choices as
part of a frame and thus exhibits an overall sequencing effect, an
additional layer which the behavioral science literature addresses is that
people generally prefer to spread outcomes over time rather than
122. See, e.g., George F. Loewenstein & Nachum Sicherman, Do Workers Prefer Increasing
Wage Profiles?, 9 J. LAB. ECON., 67, 69-70 (1991); see also William T. Ross & Itamar Simonson,
Evaluations of Pairs of Experiences: A Preference for Happy Endings, 4 J. BEHAVIORAL DECISION
MAKING 273, 273-75 (1991); Carol Varey & Daniel Kahneman, Experiences Extended Across
Time: Evaluation of Moments and Episodes, 5 J. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 169, 170-71
(1992).
123. See Loewenstein & Sicherman, supra note 122, at 69, 71-72, 74-75.
124. Ross & Simonson, supra note 122, at 276-77.
125. Id. at 277-78.
126. See Loewenstein & Prelec, supra note 113, at 91.
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concentrating them-an observation referred to as the "preference for
spreading.,127 Studies have found that for both gains and losses people
prefer spreading rather than grouping them in clusters. Precisely how
people prefer to group gains and losses remains unsettled, but there is
widespread consensus in the behavioral science literature that people's
preferences for a sequence of outcomes have to do with "how evenly the
good and bad outcomes are arranged over the total time interval."'
128
Thus, using our law student example discussed previously, the
preference for spreading would dictate that if given the choice between
Grade Sequence 1 of "A, C+, B" and Grade Sequence 2 of "B-, B-, A,"
in general the student would prefer Grade Sequence 1 because Grade
Sequence 2 piles up too many losses (i.e., two B-minuses) in one
semester relative to Grade Sequence 1.
In terms of compensation design, the sequencing effect supports
framing the terms of compensation agreements and PFP as part of a
larger plan, scheme, or sequence. If executives view their one year
benchmark as being separable from their five-year benchmark then there
is a risk that executives will discount the value of the five-year future
reward and not be motivated to make the decisions to achieve the five-
year metric. If, on the other hand, executives view their compensation
arrangement as a sequence of events spread over a period of time, then
the human urge to improve their preferences over time should spur
executives to stay the course for the desired five years and improve their
outcome.
Second, care should be taken that compensation arrangements
reflect an escalation of rewards and an even spreading of potential gains
and losses. If an agreement seems too punitive, i.e., potential for losses
are grouped together, this could actually serve as a deterrent to
executives because they would rather be paid a steady smaller amount
rather than take the risk and experience a series of losses. Similarly, if all
the value is on the back end of the sequence, this will be discounted
more and thus serve less of an incentivizing function.
C. The Gaming of Peer Groups and the Abuse of Medians
A key method used by companies, their shareholders, and other
market players to assess how adequately executive pay is tied to firm
performance is to look at similarly situated firms or "peer" firms in the
industry. The SEC requires public companies to list all peer companies
used in their compensation setting process and a description of the
127. Seeid. at 94.
128. See id. at 94-95.
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process employed in selecting a peer group. 129 A well-designed peer
group is often thought to be one that is constructed based on
considerations such as:
*[company] size
*industry
eorganizational structure
egeographical location
*performance [goals]. 130
The use of peer groups can be helpful in understanding the form and
design of compensation at similar companies, as well as, the levels
of pay opportunity and actual pay delivered to executives at
these companies.
One common concern about the use of peer groups is that those in
charge of setting executive pay may "gam[e] the selection of peers for
the purposes of gaming executive compensation."' 131 For example, one
might point to the case of the NYSE whose peer group included several
financial institutions substantially larger than the NYSE, but did not
include any of the other stock exchanges. 132 A more extreme example
can be found in the case of Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc., whose sales
revenue is approximately eighty-five times lower than Kraft Foods, Inc.,
yet Tootsie Roll includes Kraft as a peer.133 In 2009, the Wall Street
Journal reported that "roughly 40% of companies specify that they aim
to pay their CEOs more than the median of their peers," a result which,
according to a director of a leading proxy advisor, leads to a
"continuous[] spiral[] upwards" in executive pay.134 Similarly, corporate
scholar Charles Elson has stated that the "sharp rise in executive pay [is]
a result of the practice of setting C.E.O. compensation by looking at
what other companies in the same industry are doing, then adding
a bit.
135
129. MERIDIAN COMPENSATION PARTNERS, LLC, COMPENSATION COMMITTEE HANDBOOK:
DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE PEER GROUPS 1 (2011), available at http://www.meridiancp.com/images/
uploads/25_DevelopingEffective Peer Groups.pdf.
130. Id.
131. Carl Tuna, Picking Big 'Peers' to Set Pay, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2009, at B7.
132. See Michael Faulkender & Jun Yang, Inside the Black Box: The Role and Composition of
Compensation Peer Groups, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 257, 258 n.2 (2010) (noting that in 2002, the year
prior to Richard Grasso's (former CEO at the NYSE) departure, the NYSE's peer group included
large financial institutions like Citigroup, FleetBoston Financial, Merrill Lynch, GE Capital,
GMAC, and American Express).
133. See Tuna, supra note 131, atB7.
134. Id.
135. Nathaniel Popper, C.E.O. Pay, Rising Despite the Din, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at B9.
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One response to this observation that compensation committees and
boards may reward above the median thus leading to an "upward spiral"
in executive compensation, is that this may be an example of managers
exercising power over the board to extract rents. An alternative response
is that the selection of peers that perform better can be attributed to what
one academic called the "Lake Wobegon effect," where every firm
believes that they have hired above average executives and so they both
select "peers" who they view as above average, and, using these peers as
their benchmark, pay their executives above the group average. 
36
Whether this "gaming" of the selection of peers results from self-serving
motivations or something less nefarious remains the subject of much
debate. As one author of a study on peer group selection put it, "I don't
honestly believe that everybody is self-serving .... But I also don't
believe that everybody is doing this purely naively."
' 137
That companies continue this upward spiral trend in executive pay
and continue to select seemingly non-comparable companies to include
in their peer group-even in the face of increased transparency in the
compensation process, greater accountability to shareholders, and public
outrage over wealth disparity-are of particular concern to observers. At
least two explanations for this behavior can be found in behavioral
studies on the "herding effect" and the cognitive bias of "anchoring
and adjustment."
1. The Herding Effect
The concept of "herding" refers to the tendency of humans (or
animals for that matter) to mimic the actions (both rational and
irrational) of a large group.138 Herding can be described as "a form of
convergent social behavior that can be broadly defined as the alignment
of the thoughts or behaviors of individuals in a group (herd) through
local interaction and without centralized coordination. 1 39 In general,
herding behavior can be broken down into two broad categories. First,
herding that is based on information-i.e., the reason that individuals
engage in certain activities is because they have private information or
they can infer information from others' actions that dictate that they take
136. See Rachel M. Hayes & Scott Schaefer, CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect, 94 J. FIN.
ECON. 280, 280-82 (2009). Lake Wobegon is a fictitious town in Garrison Keillor's "A Prairie
Home Companion" radio show where "all the children are above average." Id. at 280.
137. Tuna, supra note 131, at B7 (quoting Professor Rodrigo Verdi of Massachusetts Institute
of Technology's Sloan School of Management).
138. See Ramsey M. Raafat et al., Herding in Humans, 13 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sci 420, 420
(2009).
139. Id.
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a certain course of action. 40 In this instance, herding would be described
as rational.' 4' Second, and on the other hand, where behavior is
undertaken simply because others in the group undertook that behavior,
the behavior may be entirely irrational. 42 Thus the more people
undertake an action the more likely it is that others exposed to that action
will follow suit (irrespective of whether said action is rational
or irrational).
The herding effect has been widely studied in a number of fields,
such as behavioral finance, ethology, and social psychology. 143 A vast
and varied range of phenomena have been categorized as examples of
herding behavior. These include stock market bubbles, financial
speculation, Tulip mania, cult behavior, and uncoordinated social
groupings that have become part of common parlance such as "fads," the
"bandwagon effect," "mass hysteria," and "Groupthink."' 44
In the executive compensation space, herding may have been
unwittingly encouraged by the SEC's CD&A rules, which require
companies to disclose the compensation of their top five executives and
how the packages are structured. Since no company or executive wants
to be singled out as a bad apple, companies and executives may be
induced to "herd" in the way that they benchmark, structure, and
describe their executives' compensation. 45 This is particularly true in
light of the recent enhanced disclosure rules, which require companies to
provide detailed tabular and narrative disclosure about their executives'
compensation. 46 Of course, what this means is that the amount
executives make at each company is now transparent, and firms and
140. Seeidat421.
141. See id.
142. See id at 423.
143. See generally MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER, ASSET PRICING UNDER ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION: BUBBLES, CRASHES, TECHNICAL ANALYSIS, AND HERDING (2001) (discussing the
effect of herding on the economy); see also Michelle Baddeley, Herding, Social Influence and
Economic Decision-Making: Socio-Psychological and Neuroscientiflc Analyses, 365 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y B 281, 282-85 (2010); W.D. Hamilton, Geometry for the Selfish
Herd, 31 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 295, 297-300 (1971) (discussing how herd behavior can emerge
from the coordinated behavior of individual animals engaged in predator avoidance).
144. See, e.g., Douglas M. Patterson & Vivek Sharma, Did Herding Cause the
Stock Market Bubble of 1998-2001? 4-5 (Nov. 18, 2007) (unpublished paper),
available at https://www.editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db-name=
SNDE2008&paper id=60; see also JOE SMITH, HERDING THE Moo: EXPLOITS OF A MARTIAL ARTS
CULT, LEGEND OF THE UPSIDE DOWN KING 291-95 (2006); Robert R. Prechter, Jr., Unconscious
Herding Behavior as the Psychological Basis of Financial Market Trends and Patterns, 2 J.
PSYCHOL. & FIN. MARKETS 120, 121 (2001); Susan Cain, The Rise of the New Groupthink, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012, at SRI.
145. Disclosure Requirements, supra note 53.
146. Id.
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executives are now in a position to get a peek at their competitor's
figures and know how they compare to market. Executives and
companies seeking to hire executives or re-negotiate an executive's pay
package can all see these figures, and the more those figures coalesce
around a norm, the more likely each company will execute an executive
compensation contract that adopts this norm and thus follows the herd.
The danger in behavioral herding is that it creates a situation where
there is a large group of actors undertaking an action that may be highly
irrational for a large number of them. In the context of stock markets,
such irrational herding behavior could result in market instability, large
scale losses, and a destabilization of stock prices. 147 Similarly, in the
context of executive compensation, irrational herding behavior could
result in a macro shift away from optimal contracts to more bloated
compensation contracts and a continued upward spiral in compensation
without a commensurate accrual of value to shareholders.
In addition, the literature on herding highlights that when an
individual's behavior aligns with that of the rest of the group, a process
of de-individuation occurs. 148 De-individuation describes the process by
which individuals who are part of a group lose their sense of
individuality and, as a result, the normal constraints against deviant
behavior are diminished. 149 De-individuation has been conceived as a
phenomenon where "anonymity and reduced feelings of individual
responsibility provide a mechanism for situational forces to collectively
drive behavior immersing the individual into the coup or herd."15 In the
context of executive compensation, de-individuation can explain why
even in the face of criticism that a company is using a skewed peer
group, a company does not adjust its peer group in response to this
criticism but instead rationalizes its choice of peer group in an attempt to
pass public scrutiny. In a sense, herding and the accompanying de-
individuation could function as an insurance policy for a company that is
following the norm, but yet may be making irrational choices that are
suboptimal for that particular company.
147. See, e.g., Andy Puckett & Xuemin (Sterling) Yan, Short-Term Institutional Herding and
Its Impact on Stock Prices 6 (Mo. Sch. Bus., Working Paper), available at
http://business.missouri.edu/yanx/research/Herding.pdf; see also ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL
EXUBERANCE 151-53 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing informational cascades); Bogaghan Celen & Shachar
Kariv, Distinguishing Informational Cascades from Herd Behavior in the Laboratory, 94 AM.
ECON. REV. 484, 484 (2003) (describing how an informational cascade occurs "when an infinite
sequence of individuals ignore their private information when making a decision").
148. Raafat et al., supra note 138, at 424.
149. See id.
150. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Further empirical work needs to be undertaken in this area to assess
whether the executive compensation process exhibits behavioral herding,
and if so whether such herding is rational or irrational behavior.
Analyzing peer group selection through this light could help policy-
makers in designing policies that limit irrational herding in peer
selection, while eschewing policies that seek to correct seemingly
skewed results, but which are really the result of rational herding.
2. Anchoring and Adjustment
Like herding, the behavioral concept of "anchoring and adjustment"
offers additional insight into why companies pay their executives above
the median of their selected peer group. "Anchoring and adjustment"
refers to the idea that people become so wedded or "anchored" to the
initial value that it becomes their point of reference, and any
"adjustments" will be made from that initial value. 15' To illustrate, in a
widely cited experiment on the anchoring effect, participants were asked
to estimate various quantities, stated in percentages (e.g., the percentage
of African countries in the United Nations). 5 2 For each quantity, a
number between zero and one hundred was determined by spinning a
wheel in the participant's presence. The participants were instructed first
to indicate whether that number was lower or higher than the value they
estimated, and then to estimate the value of the quantity by increasing or
decreasing from the given number. Different numbers were given to
different groups, and these arbitrary numbers had a notable effect on the
participants' estimates. For example, the authors highlighted that the
median percentage estimates of the percentage of African countries in
the United Nations were 25% and 45% depending on whether
participants received an arbitrary number of 10% or 65%,
respectively. 153
As Professors Tversky and Kahneman noted:
[i]n many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial
value that is adjusted to yield the final answer. The initial value, or
starting point, may be suggested by the formulation of the problem, or
it may be the result of a partial computation. In either case, adjustments
are typically insufficient. 1
54
151. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 Sci. 1124, 1128 (1974).
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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Anchoring has been observed not only when a starting value is given to a
participant, but also when a participant bases his or her estimate on the
result of an incomplete computation. To illustrate, Professors Tversky
and Kahneman asked participants to take five seconds to estimate the
answer to Problem 1: 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1, and record their
estimate. 55 The professors then asked the same subjects to take another
five seconds to estimate the answer to Problem 2: 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x
7 x 8, and record their estimate.
156
Most people provided a higher estimate for Problem 1 than for
Problem 2 because they became anchored to the higher numbers
presented first in Problem 1. When given to two groups of high school
students, the median estimate for Problem 1 was 2250, while the median
estimate for Problem 2 was 512. The correct answer is 40,320.157
Anchoring and adjustment provides an alternative explanation for
why we have continued to observe an upward spiral in executive pay
even in the face of increased transparency in the compensation process,
greater accountability to shareholders, and public outrage over wealth
disparity. PFP makes a significant percentage of an executive's
compensation uncertain because it is dependent on the achievement of
various performance measures at some point in the future, which are not
entirely within the executive's control. Thus executives and the boards
negotiating an executive compensation agreement are forced to make
judgments under uncertainty, which in turn leaves more room for mental
short-cuts and other biases, such as anchoring and adjustment. 58 When
people engage in anchoring and adjustment the resulting value may be
suboptimal. Additionally, if as discussed above, the homogenization in
executive PFP design is the result of irrational herding behavior, then the
initial starting value to which people become anchored will be
suboptimal and will further exacerbate the suboptimality of the
resulting contract, because any adjustments upward or downward will
be insufficient.
D. The Danger of Ex Ante Financial Metrics
An inherent feature of the PFP model is that it requires the parties
to pre-defme the future goals to be attained and upon which
compensation will be based. In turn, these pre-determined goals tend to
be predominantly financial in nature with the most common ones being
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Cf id.
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the achievement of a defined level of total shareholder return or the
achievement of a certain stock price. The use of financial goals has been
roundly criticized for encouraging nefarious behavior by executives such
as earnings manipulations and accounting massaging. 5 9 Thus, much of
the critiques focus on external and observable drawbacks created by the
use of ex ante financial metrics.
Of equal concern however, are the internal and intrinsic changes
that may occur on both an institutional and individual level with the use
of ex ante financial metrics. Of particular concern in this regard are
behavioral studies on optimism bias, outcome bias, and "crowding out."
1. Optimism Bias
"Optimism" is the tendency to "put the most favorable construction
upon actions" and events or to "anticipate the best possible outcome." 160
Behavioral studies on the effects of optimism in decision-making under
uncertainty reveal that people tend to be overly optimistic about their
chances realizing for future gains, and overly optimistic about their
chances for avoiding future losses (also referred to as the "optimism
effect" or "optimism bias"). 161 In the executive compensation space,
optimism bias could unwittingly cause boards and executives to agree to
unachievable performance targets ex ante.
According to behavioral researchers Berndsen and van der Pligt,
"optimism has asymmetric effects on time preferences for gains versus
losses. 16 2 With respect to future outcomes, "losses are believed to be
avoidable and immediate gains are expected to be followed by further
gains., 163 Researchers have observed optimism bias in various decision-
settings where individuals are asked to make judgments that involve
uncertainty about the future. 164 These include studies on how students
tend to overestimate a future exam score; observations that financial
analysts consistently overestimate corporate earnings; and studies on
cigarette smokers who tend to believe that they have less of a chance of
developing smoking-related complications than other smokers. 165
159. See Faulkender et al., supra note 1, at 113.
160. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 1584-85 (3d ed. 2002).
161. See Mariette Berndsen & Joop van der Pligt, Time Is on My Side: Optimism in
Intertemporal Choice, 108 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 173, 175, 185 (2001).
162. Id. at 173.
163. Id. at 175.
164. See Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to
Debiasing Interventions, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT
313, 313-14, 320 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
165. See David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of
Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT,
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Similarly, credit card companies may be implicitly exploiting
cardholders' optimism biases because these companies understand that
people are generally willing to accept the prospect of highly punitive
interest rates in the event of late payments, because individuals are
generally optimistic that they will never be late in payment. 166
The optimism bias mindset is perfectly exemplified by Barclays
PLC's former CEO, Bob Diamond, who was renowned for setting
aggressive targets for the bank-a trait which some inside the bank
referred to as "Bobtirnism." 67 While some would attribute Mr.
Diamond's aggressive goal setting to nefarious motives, others viewed
him as always having a positive outlook, or, to use the words of The
Economist, he was "congenitally bullish. 1 68 Such congenital bullishness
may have been the external expression of optimism bias.
In terms of experiential learning, Hewlett-Packard ("HP"), which,
in the early 1990s, implemented a PFP model at thirteen separate
company units, offers a case in point.1 69 Within three years, all thirteen
units had dropped the PFP compensation structure.1 70 One of the findings
of the HP experiment was that people thought that they could outperform
the predefined metrics. 7 ' According to Harvard Business School
Professor Michael Beer, who studied the HP experiment, "the most
prevalent and striking themes in managerial decision-making in these
cases is the size of the gap between managers' initial expectations [of
benefits] and the subsequent realities [in terms of costs] .... Managers
were also overly optimistic about the benefits that would be achieved,"
assuming they would benefit in terms of higher pay.'72
These examples indicate that optimism bias could lead both
executives and boards to agree to unrealistic predefined targets, whose
achievement may not be feasible to achieve. Thus, even though pay may
be tied to performance facially, if the stated performance is unrealistic
then the executive may tie up limited resources pursuing this unrealistic
supra note 164, at 334, 334-35, 338.
166. See Joshua M. Frank, Do Credit Card Users Systematically Underestimate Their Interest
Rates? Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 30 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 133, 134-
35(2011).
167. Harry Wilson, Can Barclays' Future Live up to the 'Bobtimism' of Chief Bob Diamond?,
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 29, 2011, 11:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksand
finance/8856001/Can-Barclays- future-live-up-to-the-Bobtimism-of-chief-Bob-Diamond.html.
168. The Power of Bobtimism, ECONOMIST (Apr. 27, 2012, 8:22 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/04/barclays-agm.
169. Michael Beer & Mark D. Cannon, Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay for
Performance, 43 HUM. RES. MGMT. 3, 5 (2004).
170. Id. at7.
17 1. See id. at 15.
172. ld. at 13.
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target, while foregoing other more realistic targets that could better
contribute to company growth. Studying optimism bias in the executive
compensation space could provide a better understanding of how boards
and executives make decisions under uncertainty, which in turn would
provide policy makers an opportunity to better influence their choices. 17 3
2. Outcome Bias
The PFP model is outcome focused. It explicitly and implicitly
causes executives, companies, stockholders, analysts, the media, and
legislatures to focus overwhelmingly on the outcome achieved, and gives
short shrift to whether the outcomes were the result of a sound and
reasonable process. 174 The focus on outcome over process and the use of
outcome as a proxy for judging the inherent quality of a process is often
referred to as the "outcome effect."'1 "5 For instance, if a coach draws up a
play in the final seconds of a game which results in a winning shot,
then the coach's decision to call that play will be rated more favorably
than if the play resulted in the team losing. Of course the problem is
that the quality or correctness of the coach's decision should not
necessarily be a function of the outcome, especially in a case where the
resulting outcome was affected by some external forces beyond the
coach's control. 
176
A focus on outcomes is detrimental to a decision-making and/or
reward model because good processes that lead to bad outcomes go
unrewarded, while bad processes that lead to good outcomes reap
rewards. 177 Thus, an executive who fails to deliver on stock price, but
has successfully steered a company through a difficult period, may be
viewed less favorably than an executive whose company meets its
earnings targets, but who did not have to deal with the same difficulties
faced by the first executive. A case in point may be Facebook. Prior to
the company's initial public offering in early 2012, Mark Zuckerberg,
the company's CEO, was often praised for his decision-making
prowess. 178 Less than a year after the company went public, in the face
173. See Bemdsen & van der Pligt, supra note 161, at 185 (stating that "[k]nowing which
optimistic beliefs underlie people's choices might contribute to an understanding of time
preferences, and also provide the opportunity to influence their choices").
174. See EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 116, at 3.
175. See Baron & Hershey, supra note 16, at 570-71.
176. Cf Bemdsen & van der Pligt, supra note 161, at 185.
177. Cf id.
178. See Jena McGregor, Mark Zuckerberg's New Challenge with Facebook, WASH. POST
(Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-leadership/post/mark-zuckerbergs-
new-challenge-with-facebook/2012/08/17/e2408744-e877-11 el -8487-64e4b2a79ba8_blog.html.
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of declining stock prices, Mr. Zuckerberg's decisions are beginning to be
questioned with some critics even calling for his resignation.1
79
Awareness of the potential for outcome bias in the PFP model is
essential because: (1) where performance targets are met, outcome bias
could lead to people substituting achievement of the target metrics as
evidence that the executive is doing a good job-i.e., in fact aligning his
or her interests with those of shareholders and the corporation, and
engaging in the right level of creative thinking and risk taking; and (2)
conversely, where performance targets are not met, outcome bias could
lead people to irrationally and unfairly judge the performance of the
executive as being poor and unsatisfactory even though the executive's
decision making was sound. Moreover, in today's corporate world, the
effects of any outcome bias are magnified by short-termist practices, like
measuring a company's progress based on quarterly returns, which
emphasize the short-term outcomes, even though those outcomes may be
the result of flawed processes that may only come to light after the firm
and the executive have been rewarded by the market for meeting the
short-term goal.
In corporate law, the business judgment rule-a judge-made
doctrine which prevents a court from second-guessing the business
judgments of a corporation's board and its executives absent evidence of
fraud, bad faith, or gross negligence in the decision process-acts as a
backstop to the outcome effect.180 So long as the board of directors and
the officers can show that their decision-making process was conducted
with a modicum of diligence, reasonableness, care, and good faith,
courts will accept the resulting outcome of that process and will not
second guess the decisions of the corporation's board or its officers.
The Delaware Chancery Court's articulation of the business
judgment rule in the case of In re Caremark International Inc.
Derivative Litigation poignantly highlights how courts guard against
outcome bias in considering whether directorial liability can stem from a
business decision.'18 In Caremark the court stated that:
179. See id.
180. The business judgment rule is a court made doctrine that protects the decisions of
company boards and managements from being independently reviewed or second-guessed by the
courts so long as the courts find that the decision-making process reflects that management was
acting on an informed basis, with the honest belief, and in good faith in the best interest of the
corporation. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73, 893 (Del. 1985) (holding that
the Board of Directors did not reach an informed business judgment, due to a failure to inform
themselves and their stockholders about a proposed merger, when voting to sell shares for a cash-out
merger and therefore were not entitled to protection from the business judgment rule); In re
Caremark Int'l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
181. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967-68.
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[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes
a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through
"stupid" to "egregious" or "irrational", provides no ground for director
liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed was
either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate
interests. 182
In the context of executive compensation, courts often look to the
process for setting the compensation, rather than the resulting
compensation itself. It is of no consequence to the courts how excessive
or ill-advised the compensation appears-so long as the process through
which the compensation was set appears that it was reasonable and in
good faith. A case in point is that of In re Walt Disney Derivative
Litigation,183 which dealt with whether the executive compensation of
the former president of Disney, Michael Ovitz, was excessive and
wasteful. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's
refusal to apply its own judgment and analyze whether the resulting
compensation was excessive, because the court found that the decision
making process was sound. 184 While this process-focused analytical
framework employed by courts may lead to seemingly unjust results, it
is in recognition of the truism that hindsight is indeed 20/20.
In addition to relying on the business judgment rule when faced
with litigation, one way to lessen the potential for outcome bias outside
of a litigation setting is to reward executives for sound decision-making
processes. This may not necessarily have to be in the form of a monetary
reward, but recognitions in the form of more autonomy, more resources,
or use of the much maligned corporate jet. s8
3. Crowding Out
As alluded to in Part II.B, the current PFP regime encourages and
engenders a culture of executives and shareholders that are overly
focused on financial outcomes, at the expense of inculcating other
worthy and intrinsic values such as creativity, trust, empathy, honesty,
and self-confidence. To put it differently, PFP suffocates an executive's
instinct to act on these intrinsic values in situations where such actions
will not lead to the achievement of predefined metrics. This unfortunate
result has been observed in other areas and is referred to as "crowding
out."
182. Id. at 967.
183. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
184. Id. at 35, 73.
185. See discussion infra Part IV.
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The behavioral science studies on crowding out reflect that when a
reward system motivates by offering the prospect of money or a penalty
in the form of a monetary fine, people narrow their decision perspective
and predominantly focus on the monetary aspect of what is being offered
either as punishment or reward. 186 This predominant focus on the
pecuniary tends to erode worthy intrinsic human characteristics that we
would like to encourage. 187
Examples of crowding out abound both in experimental studies and
the real world. One study involved a day care with the problem of
parents who were repeatedly late in coming to collect their children at
the end of the day.188 As one can imagine, late pickups impacted the day
care because they had to stay open longer thereby incurring various
additional expenses, and beyond the monetary impact, employees were
tired and wanted to go home to their own families and attend to their
own needs. 89 Upon the advice of experts, the day care adopted a fine
system. Parents would be charged a monetary fine for each increment of
time that they were late. ' 90 To everyone's surprise instead of the number
of late pick-ups decreasing, they actually increased! ' 9' Why? Well, after
talking to the tardy parents, the day care discovered that parents were
simply building in the cost of the fine into their calculus of whether to be
late, which included a calculation of just how late they could afford to
be. 192 Once they had built in the fine, their conscience was free and they
felt no impulse to try to pick up their children on time. 93 In other words
the fine had crowded out whatever intrinsic motivation the parents may
have had to act in a selfless way towards the day care by being on time.
In the world of sports, consider the case of former NFL player
Rodney Harrison. In 2010, NBC's Football Night in America ran a story
on Harrison who was notorious for what some viewed as
unsportsmanlike conduct, such as taunting on the field and helmet-to-
helmet hits. 194 The NBC reporter asked Harrison whether the thousand
186. See Juan Cardenas et al., Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding, 28
WORLD DEV. 1719, at 1719-20, 1731.
187. See generally STOUT, supra note 18.
188. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-3 (2000).
189. See id. at 4.
190. Id. at 4-5.
191. Id. at 5-7.
192. Id. at 14.
193. See id. at 13-14.
194. Vic Carucci, Rodney Harrison: Suspensions Only Way to Stop Vicious Hits, NFL (Oct. 19,
2010, 8:36 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d8 1b76c8b/article/rodney-harrison-
suspensions-only-way-to-stop-vicious-hits (discussing how hefty fines were not enough to deter
players from engaging in helmet to helmet hits); Jim Trotter, After Week 6 Carnage, NFL Has to
Protect Defenseless Players, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 19, 2010, 11:02 AM),
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dollar fines assessed by the NFL each time a player engaged in this type
of conduct did not deter him. 195 He responded that the fine was not a
deterrence, but rather a cost of doing business.1 96 Harrison then revealed
that he used to set aside thousands of dollars at the start of every season
to pay fines for big hits. 197
In the business world, examples of crowding out can be found in
mortgage brokers who knowingly gave loans to borrowers who they
knew could not afford these loans, predominantly because they were
incentivized to approve unqualified buyers because these brokers'
outcome-based bonuses depending on the bulk of loans generated and
not the quality.198 Similarly, the testimony of former UBS banker,
Bradley Birkenfield, in the U.S. Justice Department's case charging UBS
with coordinating a massive scheme to help wealthy Americans evade
U.S. tax laws, reveals the existence of crowding out.199 When asked by
the judge to explain why he did what he did, he quietly said "I was
employed by UBS... I was incentivized to do this business. 200
In the executive compensation space, the HP case study referred to
previously provides a real world example of how the PFP performance
model can lead to crowding out.201 At first the HP employees embraced
the new PFP system, but over time frustrations began to build and some
anti-social behavior began to emerge, which in turn had a negative effect
on productivity.202 For example, teams that were meeting their targets
would often refuse to admit people whom "they thought might be below
their level of competence., 20 3 This led to disparities among teams,
reduced the mobility between teams, and prevented the transfer of
204learning across teams. In discussing the case of HP, the researchers
noted that as "other scholars have argued ... the real problem is that
incentives work too well. Specifically, they motivate employees to focus
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/web/COM 1176128/index.htm.
195. Carucci, supra note 194.
196. See id.; Trotter, supra note 194.
197. Carucci, supra note 194; Trotter, supra note 194.
198. See, e.g., Dunstan Prial, Big Housing Fraud Settlements, but No Convictions, Fox BUS.
(Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/govemment/2012/10/12/big-housing-fraud-
settlements-but-no-convictions; E. Scott Reckard, Senate Votes to Ban Certain Bonuses for
Mortgage Brokers, Loan Officers, L.A. TIMES (May 12, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/
2010/may/I 2/business/la-fi-mortgage-bill-20100513.
199. Evan Perez, Guilty Plea by Ex-Banker Likely to Aid Probe of UBS, WALL. ST. J., June 20,
2008, at Cl.
200. Id.
201. See Beer & Cannon, supra note 169, at 3, 5, 9-10.
202. Id. at 8-11.
203. Id. at 8.
204. Id.
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excessively on doing what they need to do to gain rewards, sometimes at
the expense of doing other things that would help the organization.
' 201
What Professors Beer and Cannon witnessed at HP was the
phenomenon of crowding out. The introduction of a PFP system of
rewards actually had the negative effect of driving out prosocial
behavior and planting fertile ground for antisocial behavior. In the end,
the HP units were no better off, but in fact they were probably worse off
even though they had introduced a pay system that was supposed to
bring about more optimal and efficient behavior.
If one were to consider the effects of crowding out in the executive
compensation space, at least three unwanted and pernicious results come
to mind. First, to the extent that one believes there are problems of greed
and selfishness across the CEO population, then PFP actually
encourages these characteristics of greed and selfishness rather than
discourages them. 20 6 One only need read the academic literature,
newspaper articles, blogs, and congressional records to see that it is
indeed the case that there seems to be a widespread belief that CEOs are
greedy and selfish and, in some cases, just plain bad. °7 Responding to
this premise that CEOs are greedy and selfish, the promise of PFP was
intended to rein in and align executives' behavior with the interests of
their firm and shareholders by tying executive pay to firm
performance.2 °8
Ironically, while corporate law does not require a relentless focus
on financial gain, PFP does. 20 9 The irony is further heightened because
the whole premise of PFP is that it would bring about better conduct, but
205. Id. at 4.
206. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The CEO Pay Slice, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 199, 201, 216,
219-20 (2011); Louise Story, Wall Street Profits Were a Mirage, but Huge Bonuses Were Real,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008, at Al.
207. See Story, supra note 206, at Al.
208. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4, at 19.
209. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) (holding that the court will
not interfere with the business judgment of the corporation in a derivative action brought by
shareholders against the corporation to issue dividends); see also Einer Elhague, Sacrificing
Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 734 (2005) (arguing that managers
will be constrained in how much they pursue non-profit goals by "various market forces," such as
shareholders). State statutes generally allow the corporation to have as its purpose any lawful
business or any lawful purpose. For example, the Delaware General Corporation Law states that,
"[a] corporation may be incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any
lawful business or purposes, except as may otherwise be provided by the Constitution or other law
of this State." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2006). Similarly, the New York Business
Corporation Law states that, "[a] corporation may be formed ... for any lawful business purpose or
purposes." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 20 1(a) (McKinney 2010). And the California Corporations
Code states that "any corporation... may engage in any business activity." CAL. CORP. CODE § 206
(West 2012).
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in fact it potentially brings about a worsening of corporate conduct
because it crowds out other social and moral behavior.
Second, to the extent one cares about encouraging creativity and
intrinsically good behavior in executives, PFP actually fails in this
regard.210 As noted in the Morgan Stanley report on executive
compensation, while "[p]ay-for-performance sensitivity has significantly
increased over time, improving the alignment of CEOs with
shareholders, [it] also appears to have had unintended consequences,"
such as incentivizing executives to manipulate earnings.211
Third, PFP may unwittingly encourage a kind of selective sorting
among potential CEOs. Individuals who are attracted to simply meeting
monetary rewards will be attracted to becoming a CEO, while those who
resist this type of reductionist view of their work and their ethics may be
driven to seek another position. The snide rebuttal to this point is that the
people who may be deterred by PFP are surely in the minority and that if
executives are not outcome and profit driven, then maybe they have
missed their calling. While there may be some truth to these rebuttals, it
is prudent to think through the ramifications of a compensation system
that is predominantly focused on monetary rewards for achieving
financial metrics, but does not necessarily reward expressions of social
and moral actions. What message does such a system send to executives?
Who are the future business leaders who are likely to be attracted to such
a system? Will executives who want to do "good" feel like their hands
are tied by a culture that is obsessed with financial metrics?
The resignation in early 2012 of Goldman Sachs Executive Greg
22Smith may provide a case in point. 12 In his announced resignation, Mr.
Smith indicated that his main gripe was that the firm cared more about
making money from its clients than serving the clients' interests, and that
the environment at Goldman was "as toxic and destructive as [he had]
ever seen it.''z13 Whether Mr. Smith was in fact inclined to behave
prosocially in this self-described "toxic environment" is unknown, but to
the extent that he was so inclined based on his assertions, Goldman's
culture would have crowded out and suppressed these motivations.
2 10. This second point is related, but separate from the first. The first point takes as given the
starting assumption that corporate managers are greedy and selfish, and thus the best we can do is to
try to bring about better outcomes by tying their pay to performance. In contrast, the second point is
more optimistic and is concerned with how we can inculcate better internal/intrinsic values in
corporate managers.
211. See Faulkender et al., supra note 1, at 117.
212. See Greg Smith, Op-Ed., Why IAm Leaving Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012,
at A27.
213. Id.
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The crowding out phenomenon signals that law needs to be
extremely cautious in how we design systems of reward and motivation
in the executive compensation field. If law is concerned with inculcating
better intrinsic values in corporate managers, pay for economic
performance should be treated with a healthy dose of skepticism because
it has the potential to crowd out desirable social and moral behavior in
corporate managers.
In a book entitled Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make
Good People, corporate law scholar Lynn Stout addresses the danger of
building laws based on a selfish, rational choice, utility focused,
economic model of human beings.21 4 As Professor Stout states,
"[1]argely missing from" the debate on "'incentives' and 'accountability'
is any serious discussion of the possibility that we might encourage or
discourage particular behaviors by appealing not to selfishness, but
instead to the force of conscience. '21 5
Policy-makers can minimize the occurrence of "crowding out" in
two ways. First, shareholders, corporations, the markets, and legal policy
makers should view PFP merely as a heuristic for judging behavior, not
as a substitute for good behavior itself. Second, as discussed in Part IV
infra, instead of defining "performance" in terms of financial
performance, the definition of performance should be expanded to
include non-financial metrics. Third, instead of relying heavily on PFP to
rein in any rogue executive behavior, the law should realize that social
and moral forces, such as ego and reputation, may also serve as powerful
deterrents against objectionable executive behavior.2t 6
IV. BEYOND AN ECONOMIC CONCEPTION OF PFP-
LEVERAGING BEHAVIORAL DYNAMICS
In order to achieve the oft-recited tripartite objectives of executive
compensation-to attract, retain and motivate top executives to align
their interests with those of the shareholders-executive compensation
needs to be perceived as a human concern and not an economic one.
While PFP can and should play a role in compensating executives, if the
stated objective of executive compensation design is broader than simply
earning shareholder returns, then care should be taken to ensure that the
compensation package and our corporate culture are not skewed toward
ex ante financial incentives as the sole yardstick for reward.
214. STOUT, supra note 18, at 20-22.
215. Id. at 5.
216. Cfid. at5,8.
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Companies recognize that success requires more than focusing on
attaining financial metrics and similarly, unlike the optimal contracting
theory would have us believe, executive compensation design serves
other purposes beyond aligning executive interest to those of
shareholders. For instance, in its 2010 DEF 14A, Whole Foods Market,
Inc. stated that their intention was "to set total executive cash
compensation sufficiently high to attract and retain a strong motivated
leadership team, but not so high that it creates a negative perception with
our other stakeholders.'217 In a similar vein, in March 2012 the Hay
Group revealed the "core business practices" that distinguished the
"World's Most Admired Companies" from others-simply aligning
executive interest to shareholder interest was not on the list. 2
18
According to the Hay Group's research, the four critical factors
common to these companies' success were: the ability to execute
strategy; building structures and processes that sustain long-term
performance; successfully cultivating human capital and an environment
in which employees can thrive; and placing a high value on leadership
and talent.2 19
Successfully designing an executive compensation program to
achieve these various goals is a delicate and complex process. Among
other things, it requires: leaving latitude for boards and management to
exercise sound business discretion; leaving room for boards and
management to take on risks with the hope of generating returns; trust in
the business acumen and business integrity of the board and management
team; a clear and realistic understanding of firm strategy and suitable
metrics by which attainment of the strategy can be measured; and an
acceptance that neither shareholders nor management can predict or
control all aspects of the future.
The balance of Part IV proposes two categories of solutions that
draw on the behavioral insights developed in Part III. First, are solutions
that relate to the compensation model itself, and second, are solutions
that relate to the institutional and cultural framework within which the
model operates.
217. Whole Foods, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 17 (Jan. 25, 2010) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/865436/000120677410000109/
wholefoods defl4a.htm.
218. Hay Group Reveals "Best Practices" of the FORTUNE Magazine World's Most Admired
Companies, HAY GROUP (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.haygroup.com/in/press/Details.aspx?ID=
33073.
219. Id.
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A. The Compensation Model-Accounting for Behavioral Dynamics
As discussed in Part III, there are various behavioral dynamics that
can impact how effective a given compensation contract is at
incentivizing executives to act in the best interests of the firm, while at
the same time being an effective tool for attracting and retaining the
executive. In structuring the optimal compensation mix, boards and their
compensation consultants utilize various valuation models to assess the
incentive effects of a compensation plan. Many of these models use
market-based valuation formulas and look at value from the point of
view of shareholders, which, as one can imagine, may be different from
that of managers, especially because vis-A-vis the firm, executives may
not be able to diversify their risk to the same extent as shareholders.2 In
addition, compensation models that adopt a shareholder perspective to
design incentive contracts for executives, often times fail to account for
the value of the contract from the executive's perspective.
1. Shift from Shareholder Perspective Model to Manager
Perspective Model
The first step in my proposed solution is that any valuation of the
incentive effects of a compensation package must be informed .by a
valuation model that incorporates the perspective of the executive. One
such valuation framework was developed by Professors Lambert,
Larcker, and Verrecchia in a 1991 paper in the Journal of Accounting
Research.221 The professors found that market-based valuation models,
such as the Black-Scholes option-pricing model, did not adequately
capture the value that a manager placed on his or her compensation
contract and that "[i]n particular, the incentive properties of executive
stock options are not simple extensions of the comparative statics
associated with the Black-Scholes option-pricing model. 222 Adopting a
compensation model that values a compensation contract from an
executive's perspective would be the first step towards building in
several of the behavioral insights discussed in Part III, because adopting
such a model involves a fundamental shift in focus to better determine
how the executive's actions affect their valuation of their compensation.
220. See Lambert et al., supra note 7, at 129-30.
221. Seeid. at 131.
222. See id. at 145.
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2. Modeling for Behavioral Dynamics
In addition to a proposed shift towards executive-centered valuation
models, the second part of my proposed solution is that several of the
behavioral dynamics discussed in Part III could be built into the
compensation model. For example, modeling for hyperbolic discounting
instead of exponential discounting is already widely being done in
behavioral circles and by some economists. 223 One way that has been
proposed by economists to model for hyperbolic discounting is to model
it as "an intra-personal game among different temporal selves," so that
for the sake of the model today's "self' would be modeled as a distinct
player from tomorrow's "self. '224 This analytic framework has been
replicated in studies involving dynamically inconsistent preferences over
time, and provides a promising starting point for building in a hyperbolic
discounting function into compensation models. Moreover, as discussed
above, researchers already build individual employee characteristics into
compensation models. The most frequent one being the individual level
of risk aversion, but other traits such as levels of wealth can be built into
compensation models with relative ease.
3. Expanded Definition of "Performance"
Finally, a third proposal on how to incorporate behavioral insights
into compensation models is to allow for the inclusion of a broader
definition of "performance." As mentioned, currently "performance" is
typically defined in terms of financial metrics, such as Total Shareholder
Return ("TSR") or stock price. One way to minimize the crowding out
effect is to broaden the definition of what "performance" will be
rewarded with pay to include non-financial qualitative measures of value
such as environmental and social criteria, customer satisfaction
measures, and sustainability metrics. 225 Including such non-financial
measures of performance in incentive compensation would encourage
executives to look beyond merely meeting the proverbial "bottom line"
and instead aiming to achieve these other measures, which would lead to
more value for the firm and its stakeholders in the long-run.
Several companies already include non-financial measures of
performance in compensation models, but it is unclear how widespread a
practice this is, and even for those companies that do include non-
financial components in their incentive compensation model expressly,
these components often comprise a small fraction of the executive's
223. See, e.g., Laibson, supra note 87, at 2-3.
224. Id. at 3.
225. Various metrics abound in both the profit and for-profit sectors for measuring non-
financial success.
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overall compensation.226 From a behavioral perspective, making an
executive's pay dependent in part on non-financial metrics should be
encouraged because it would help ameliorate the crowding-out concerns
discussed in Part III.D. Moreover, including non-financial measures of
performance in an executive's compensation contract is a practice that
should be encouraged, and both implemented and adopted on a wider
scale, especially for firms which value growth and sustainability over the
long-term.227 A 2012 study found that firms which placed a premium on
sustainability (what the authors referred to as "High Sustainability"
companies) were more likely to include sustainability metrics as
measures of performance in top executive incentives, and that these High
Sustainability companies significantly exceeded the performance of their
counterparts in terms of the stock market and accounting measures.
228
Including non-financial performance in compensation models has
several other practical benefits. First, making an executive's pay
contingent on achieving a non-financial metric directly incentivizes the
executive to remain informed about the status of the company's
operations in the area that the non-financial metric seeks to measure. For
example, if the metric is targeted at capturing environmental efforts in
re-forestation, an executive who may otherwise have been content to get
a report on reforestation efforts is now incentivized to proactively act to
ensure that the company's re-forestation policies are being implemented.
Second, linking executive pay to key non-financial performance
indicators helps align the executive's mandate with the firm's mission.
The mission of most firms is not as simple and myopic as maximizing
profit. Instead, corporations tend to have a more multi-purpose mission
and expression of their value proposition to society and their investors.
For example, at Intel, part of its mission and global strategy is to "[c]are
for our people and our planet, and inspire the next generation., 229 To
measure if they are fulfilling this mission requires more than merely
hitting their TSR or stock price targets. One way that Intel attempts to
encourage management to fulfill this mission is by linking a portion of
managers' bonuses to environmental metrics. 230 According to Intel, tying
226. Cf Robert C. Eccles et al., The Impact of a Corporate Culture of Sustainability on
Corporate Behavior and Performance 10 n. 10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
17950, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17950.pdf.
227. See id. at 12.
228. Id. at 1.
229. See INTEL, 2010 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 3 (2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted), available at http://csrreportbuilder.intel.com/PDFFiles/CSR 2010_Full-Report.pdf.
230. Id. at 35.
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pay to environmental measures of performance helps managers focus on
the importance of achieving Intel's environmental objectives. 231
A third benefit of including non-financial measures of performance
as part of the calculus in designing executive pay is that financial
measures may not adequately capture the range of benefits that accrue
from the executive's efforts, and, in effect, a portion of the executive's
efforts goes unrewarded. Adopting non-financial metrics could help
capture some of these shadow benefits and thus appropriately reward the
executive for actions that create value for the company in key areas such
as environmental and social value initiatives.
In addition to changing the inputs that go into the compensation
model, a behavioral perspective points to efforts to create an institutional
and organizational culture supportive of a PFP model that treats
the frailties of human decision-making as a reality that needs to be
wrestled with, rather than one that should be ignored. The balance of
Part IV contemplates three distinct ways in which such a culture could
be inculcated.
B. The Twin Pillars of Shaming and Reputation
Studies on the roles of "reputation" and "shaming" as behavior
modifiers provide one potential avenue for addressing concerns about
executive greed and rent extraction, as well as responding to the
behavioral implications of herding, anchoring and adjustment, and
crowding out, discussed in Part 111.232 The Oxford dictionary defines
"reputation" as the beliefs or opinions that are generally held about
someone or something. 33 Similarly, "shaming" is defined as exposing a
wrong with the objective or the effect of inflicting psychological and
social costs on a wrongdoer by raising their feelings of guilt and
remorse. 234 Shaming differs from traditional legal sanctions such as
imprisonment or fines, in that it relies on a network of mutual social
understandings to be effective.235 Shaming techniques have been
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., Christo Karuna, CEO Reputation and Internal Corporate Governance 6-9 (Oct.
2009) (unpublished paper), available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/accounting/papers/
karuna.pdf.
233. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 678 (2d ed. 1989).
234. See Note, Shame, Stigma and Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions in
Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186, 2187 (2003).
235. Advocates of shaming penalties point out that they are cheap to administer plus they also
point to their effectiveness. A Texas district court judge, Ted Poe, who is known for his deployment
of shaming penalties articulated his reasons for using shaming as follows: "a little shame goes a long
way. Some folks say everyone should have high self-esteem, but that's not the real world.
Sometimes people should feel bad." Amitai Etzioni, Back to the Pillory?, 68 AM. SCHOLAR 43, 46-
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employed in several other areas of law and policy, such as tax (several
states now post the names of tax delinquents on a publicly accessible
website), criminal law (courts force offenders to take out billboard ads
proclaiming their wrong and their remorse), and land use regulation.
236
The importance of reputation in the corporate world is widely
documented by practitioners and academics alike.237 A 2003 study by a
noted reputation strategist concluded that CEO reputation counts for up
to fifty percent of a corporation's reputation and has a significant
influence on investors' decisions and stock analysts'
recommendations.23t In addition, a direct indication of the extent to
which reputation factors into a corporation's risk management is the
appearance of reputational risk descriptions in public corporations' risk
factor sections of their disclosure documents.
The SEC's enhanced CD&A rules, required say on pay votes, and
proposed internal pay equity rules all serve as potential shaming
mechanisms-they allow the public to see how compensation has been
set and the public then has the tools to shame that company or CEO. In
2004, Professors Bebchuk and Fried posited that the market was not a
sufficient antidote to rogue executive compensation schemes because
there was no transparency about the executive compensation process,
and executives and firms could easily engage in a game of hide-the-
ball.239 With the implementation of the enhanced CD&A rules and
required say on pay votes, the concerns expressed by Bebchuk and Fried
are significantly diminished, and now with the enhanced transparency,
the market should be able to shame rogue executives if it so desires.
Shaming is already used in varying degrees in the corporate world.
For example, shareholder activists often take out full page Wall Street
Journal advertisements intended to air the dirty laundry of their targets.
47 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, critics of shaming penalties argue
that they are morally degrading, that use of shaming techniques may erode other socially valuable
norms (such as dignity), that too much shaming actually has the inverse effect of not serving as a
deterrent at all, and that some shaming techniques are illegal. See, e.g., Steven Tadelis, The Power
of Shame and the Rationality of Trust 15-16 (U.C. Berkeley, Haas Sch. of Bus. Working Paper, Mar.
2, 2011), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/stadelis/shame trust_03011 1.pdf; see also
Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1917
(1991) (arguing that shaming is not an effective method of punishment in criminal law today).
236. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-33 (West 2012).
237. See, e.g., Karuna, supra note 232, at 6-9.
238. See Press Release, Betsy Turenne, Burson-Marsteller, Non-Governmental Organizations
Seek More Candor in Corporate Social Responsibility Reports, available at http://www.burson-
marsteller.com/newsroom/lists/PressReleases/DispForm.aspx?ID=4 9
4 &nodename =Press%2OReleas
es%20Archive; see also Leslie Gains-Ross, CEO Reputation: A Key Factor in Shareholder Value, 3
CORP. REPUTATION REv. 366, 366-67 (2000).
239. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 4, at 53-54, 58.
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Similarly, the financial press often publishes list of wrong-doers (the so-
called "rosters of shame"), and courts sometimes employ shaming
techniques with great effect to draw public attention to particularly
egregious acts. In 2009, for example, a N.Y. federal judge ordered a
former pharmaceutical executive convicted of making false statements to
write a book about his experiences relating to the case.240 News outlets
and the blogosphere took note. Similarly, in the more recent case of In re
El Paso Corp. Shareholder Litigation,24t Chancellor Leo Strine writing
for the Delaware Chancery Court went to great lengths to tongue lash
Goldman Sachs and the CEO of El Paso for their roles in the sale of the
company, holding them up as examples of the type of behavior that will
not be looked on favorably by the courts.
242
One potential drawback to the efficacy of a shaming technique in
executive compensation is the de-individuation process discussed in Part
III.C. If, as suggested in Part III.C, firms and executives are herding in
the manner in which they set executive compensation, then an attempt to
use shaming techniques may be blunted if all firms in the given herd are
adopting roughly the same compensation mix then each firm may feel a
sense of collective security and not feel pressured into changing their
compensation process. The use of shaming as a norm-enforcing
mechanism should not, however, be overlooked. The utilization of
shaming techniques to incentivize executives to make "good" decisions
would catch the worst offenders. In addition, it has the advantage of
drawing on existing techniques that shareholders, customers, the media,
and the courts are already using, without the need for an intensive top-
down regulatory approach.
C. The Role of Diversity
A long-standing concern in corporate law is the optimal mix in the
composition of the board of directors-both in terms of inside and
outside directors, and along other matrices such as the gender and racial
diversity of the board. 43 Enhancing diversity in the boardroom could
240. Natasha Singer, Judge Orders Former Bristol-Meyers Executive to Write Book, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2009, at B3.
241. 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012).
242. See id. at 437-47.
243. See generally Lisa Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost Benefit Analysis
of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 795 ("This Article
critically examines the viability of these business rationales for diversity .... ") [hereinafter Fairfax,
Bottom Line]; Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C.
L. REv. 856 (2011) [hereinafter Fairfax, BoardDiversity] (arguing that rationalizing board diversity
on business terms has not resulted in greater board diversity).
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have the additional advantage of helping to diminish the prevalence of
the optimism effect, anchoring and adjustment, and the herding effect in
the executive compensation space. 2 "
At least two data points offer support for this position. First, the
corporate law literature on the dynamics of inside directors versus
outside directors offers two reasons to believe that in general outside
directors will be less susceptible to the optimism effect than their inside
counterparts in the context of making firm decisions.245 The first reason
is that compared to inside directors, outside directors' view of
themselves and their worth are less tied up with or affected by the
fortunes of the firm.246 The second reason is that, compared to inside
directors, the process of selecting outside directors is less likely to be
influenced by whether the outside director is overly optimistic about the
firm.247 Now while diversity obviously does not need to be achieved by
looking to only outside directors, what the literature on inside-outside
director dynamics shows in terms of a broader principle is that
bringing in a diverse mix of views, interests, motivations, objectives,
etc., reduces the likelihood for optimism bias and may lead to more
realistic decisions.
Second, and more generally speaking, a large body of empirical
evidence shows that error judgments often result when like-minded
people undertake decision-making. 248 People who share similar interests
and similar views typically make decisions that reflect their pre-
deliberation tendencies. 249 The more these pre-deliberation tendencies
align, the more likely that the resulting decision may be subject to
judgments of error. In the context of executive compensation, behavioral
science predicts that boards and executives would tend to be optimistic
about their future, which in turn leads them to overestimate their chances
of success and set unrealistic future metrics that may be improbable to
achieve.25° On the other hand, if the board were diverse, i.e., there truly
was a diverse range of views, then the presence of diverse views in the
244. For the purposes of this Article, "diversity" refers to diversity in board members'
viewpoints, which may or may not correlate to directors' "diversity" in the more traditional sense:
race, ethnicity, gender, etc.
245. See David Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law Norms and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 803, 809-10
(2001).
246. See id. at 803.
247. See id. at 809-10.
248. See Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 759-60 (2003).
249. See id. at 759.
250. See discussion of optimism bias in Part III.D. 1, supra. More empirical work needs to be
done in this area. For example, how many executives are typically reaching the long-term targets set
out in their compensation arrangements?
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board room should infuse other considerations and perspectives into the
discussion, and should act as a check on a deliberative process that
would otherwise result in optimistic, but highly unrealistic compensation
arrangements.
In addition, beyond tempering potential optimism bias, board
diversity could also mediate against the herding effect, and anchoring
and adjustment effects discussed in Part III, supra. The more diverse the
decision-making group, the less the chance of pre-deliberation
homogenization, hence the lower the chance for anchoring and
adjustment, and also the lower the chance for irrational herding.
The extent to which diversity can temper behavioral biases is
largely unexplored in the empirical literature, but it is an area that merits
exploration particularly because it links to the broader discussions in
corporate circles about the value of a diverse board.25' In terms of
operationalizing diversity as a means of tempering the realities of how
humans make decisions, the elegance of it is that there is not much work
to be done in the sense that diversity initiatives and diversity as a value
are already beginning to take hold in the corporate space.
In terms of legal initiatives, in December 2009, the SEC approved a
rule requiring public companies to provide disclosure of whether and to
what extent a corporation's nominating committee considers diversity
when nominating candidates to the corporation's board.252 The rule
became effective on February 28, 2010.253 Under the rule corporations
must disclose "whether, and if so how, the nominating
committee ... considers diversity in identifying nominees for
director., 254 If the board or nominating committee has "a policy with
regard to the consideration of diversity in identifying director nominees,"
the final rule requires the company to disclose "how this policy is
implemented" and "how the nominating committee (or the board)
assesses the effectiveness of its policy. '255 The SEC's adoption of the
rule and the comments received by the SEC during the notice and
comment period, reflect that the SEC and a significant number of
corporate players appear to place a high premium on achieving diversity
in their organization and in their board rooms. 6
Interestingly enough, however, when it comes to diversity, the
United States (both in terms of actual law and corporate culture) has
251. See Fairfax, Bottom Line, supra note 243, at 810-11.
252. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010).
253. Id. 249.
254. Id. 229.407(c)(2)(vi).
255. Id.
256. See Fairfax, Board Diversity, supra note 243, at 860.
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been more tepid in response when compared to other countries. For
example, Norway law requires that public shareholder-owned
corporations (or "ASAs," as referred to in Norway) have an average of at
257least forty percent women on their board or face dissolution.
Similarly, a 2011 study found that "the U.S.... lags behind countries
such as Bulgaria, Latvia, and South Africa in board representation by
women."258 Indeed, an empirical study on the presence of women and
people of color on U.S. corporate boards reveals that such diversity has
remained relatively unchanged over the past several years. 25 9 According
to the study, the number of Fortune 1000 companies with at least one
person of color on their board grew 2%, from 76% to 78% between 2005
and 2007.260 Similarly, from 2004 to 2009, the number of S&P 500
companies with at least one female director grew a mere 1%, from 88%
to 89% over the five-year period.261 What these studies suggest is that
representation of the groups studied has become fairly stagnant, or as
one author put it, has "hit a barrier.
'262
In terms of this Article and corporate law in general, what this
means is that diversity as a principle is yet to be fully operationalized on
a broad scale, and hence the potential benefits of board diversity have
yet to be truly realized. This Article posits that in addition to adding
value in the various ways that others have described, the continued
inculcation of diversity as a principle and as a norm in the corporate
space could serve as an antidote to several of the behavioral outcomes
discussed in Part III.
D. Countering Problems of Inter-Temporal
Discounting and Motivation with Endowment and Framing
The behavioral studies on inter-temporal discounting and intrinsic
motivation discussed in Part III show that when rewards occur too far in
the future they may not serve as sufficient motivation for the desired
action; that people tend to be risk averse and that people tend to prefer an
improving sequence over a declining one. Each of these observations
257. See Public Limited Liability Companies Act, Norges Lover, No. 45, 13.6.1997.
258. Sylvia Ann Hewlett, Women on Boards: America Is Falling Behind, HARV. BUS. REV.
BLOG NETWORK (May 3, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/hbr/hewlett/2011/05/women on
boards america.html.
259. KORN/FERRY INST., 34TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 6-7 (on file with
Hofstra Law Review).
260. See id at 7.
261. See SPENCER STUART, 2009 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 8, 15 (2009), available at
http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSBI2009.pdf.
262. KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 259, at 7.
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and findings from studies on the endowment effect and framing can be
used to enhance the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts to
better motivate executives to pursue the desired action over a given
series of time frames.
1. Endowment Effect
The endowment effect captures the idea that people value an item
more once they are in possession of that item.263 To illustrate, in 1981
the originator of the endowment effect, Richard Thaler, conducted an
experiment in which he gave Cornell University mugs to half of the
students in a class and none to the other half.264 He then asked the class
to bargain and trade, but virtually no trading occurred because the price
demanded by those with the mugs far exceeded the price those without
the mugs were willing to pay for one.265 Thaler's experiment has since
been replicated several times over, all with the same result people attach
more value to items that they already possess.266
Two solutions currently offered as alternative ways to design
compensation contracts are solutions to structure compensation based on
long-term escrow accounts and solutions to utilize only restricted stock
or restricted stock options in the incentive portion of a compensation
package-both solutions would implicitly leverage the findings on
endowment effect.2 67
With respect to using long-term escrow accounts, Professor Edmans
et al. proposed a compensation system that would escrow compensation
for a set period of years continuing into the executive's retirement. 268 An
important feature of their proposed design is that the executive would
only be able to withdraw a percentage of the escrow account in each
period.269 As the authors noted, among other things this feature ensures
"that the CEO has sufficient equity in the future to induce effort. 2 70 One
additional dimension that could be added on to Professor Edmans'
solution, which would heighten the endowment effect, is to consider
263. See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Source Dependence in the Valuation
of Objects, 7 J. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 157, 158 (1994); see also David Dunning et al.,
Ecocentric Empathy Gaps in Social Interaction and Exchange, in 18 ADVANCES IN GROUP
PROCESSES 65, 73 (Shane R. Thye et al. eds., 2001).
264. Dunning et al., supra note 263, at 73.
265. See id.
266. See, e.g., Loewenstein & Issacharoff, supra note 263, at 159, 165; see also Dunning et al.,
supra note 263, at 73-74.
267. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 77, at 361, 363; Edmans et al., supra note 77, at 1621-
23.
268. See Edmans et al., supra note 77, at 1605, 1634.
269. Seeid. at 1606.
270. Id.
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subtracting from cash deposits in the escrow account if performance falls
below specified targets.271
Similarly, in a 2009 essay, Professors Bhagat and Romano argued
that "incentive compensation plans should consist of only restricted
stock and restricted stock options. '72 These would be restricted in that
they could not be sold, or in the case of the options, exercised for a given
number of years.273 One of the benefits of their proposal is that the
restricted stock and restricted stock options have a "natural 'clawback'
feature" because the value to the executives will naturally "dissipate[] as
the value of the firm's shares decline.2 74 Because both sets of solutions
rely on the threat of taking a benefit away both implicitly utilize the
endowment effect, and thus both are highly beneficial from a behavioral
dynamics perspective.
2. Framing
The observation that people tend to be risk averse would suggest
that between two equal choices, the choice that an executive will make is
to some extent dependent on whether the choice is framed as a loss or a
gain. The idea that people's decision to choose Option A or Option B is
affected by the way the two options are framed, where Option A and
Option B represent two equal choices, has been termed the "framing
effect., 275 For example, a set of experiments on framing and the framing
effect performed by psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman,
demonstrated that changes in the formulation of mathematically identical
decision problems in terms of loss or gain caused significant shifts of
preference.276 Tversky and Kahneman defined a "decision problem" in
terms of "the acts or options among which one must choose, the possible
outcomes or consequences of these acts, and the contingencies or
conditional probabilities that relate outcomes to acts. 277 Tversky and
Kahneman posited that decision choices framed as gains will often lead
to risk averse outcome preferences, while choices framed as losses will
often lead to risk taking outcome preferences.278 In sum, the way the
271. I am grateful to Professor Bill Wang for prompting me to consider this solution.
272. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 77, at 363 (emphasis omitted).
273. id.
274. Id. at 367.
275. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and Psychology
of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981); see also David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Ideology,
Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization, 1 INT'L SOC. MOVEMENT RES. 197, 198 (1988).
276. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 275, at 453.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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problem was presented had a systematic effect on how people perceived
the problem and responded to the problem.
Borrowing insights from the framing literature and applying them
in the executive compensation space suggests that we could enhance our
chances of incentivizing executive behavior if we are cognizant of the
choice of the decision frame that we employ in negotiating and drafting
the compensation contract. This observation is supported by a recent
doctoral dissertation in which the author studied the effects of framing in
compensation contracts in general (not necessarily executive
compensation contracts). 279 The study observed that people tended to
prefer contracts that were framed as "bonuses" over ones that were
framed as "penalties," but those that were framed as penalties resulted in
greater exertion of "effort" on the part of the recipient than those that
were framed as "bonuses. '280 While it does not appear that this study has
been replicated, if the results of the study hold true this would further
underscore the need for care in designing an executive's compensation
contract with a careful mix of loss and gain components, and it would
also suggest that while executives may prefer ex ante contracts framed as
gains or bonuses, over the life of the contract incentives framed as losses
or penalties be the better motivator for "good" executive behavior.
Moreover, building on the insights from the discussion on sequencing
effects in Part III, care should also be taken in the contract design to
avoid lumping too many incidents of losses or penalties together, and the
end result of the contract should be framed in terms of a gain or bonus
rather than a loss or penalty.
E. Strategic Use of Perquisites and Non-Monetary Rewards
Finally, as discussed in Part III, a large part of the problem with
PFP is that it encourages a corporate culture that is overwhelmingly
focused on achieving financial goals, which could lead to both outcome
bias, and a "crowding out" of other intrinsic motivations and behavioral
qualities such as integrity, trustworthiness, and cooperativeness. One
solution to diminish the effects of outcome bias and "crowding out" is to
reassess the use of non-monetary rewards in an executive's
compensation package.
279. See generally Alisa Gabrielle Brink, The Effects of Risk Preference and Loss Aversion on
Individual Behavior Under Bonus, Penalty, and Combined Contract Frames (Apr. 4, 2008)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University), available at http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/
submitted/etd-04112008-185426/unrestricted/BrinkADissertation.pdf.
280. See id. at 50.
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In general, non-monetary rewards can be broken down into two
categories-perquisites and other non-monetary rewards. As discussed
in Part II, perquisites or "perks" constitute additional compensation for
senior executives which are not available to most salaried employees.
These include reserved parking spaces, use of the company jet, and
relocation expenditures. Perks are a form of non-monetary reward and
most perks are status-based-meaning that by reason of the executive's
position the executive becomes entitled to use the company jet, to have
the special parking space, to receive relocation expenditures, etc. There
are, however, other forms of non-monetary rewards, which are
contingent not on status, but on the recipient actually doing something to
earn the reward (what I shall call "earned non-monetary rewards"). This
latter category includes non-monetary rewards such as plaques (for
example, an "employee of the month" plaque), trophies, certificates,
public acknowledgement at the company's retreat, and any other non-
monetary gesture that is bestowed on the executive to express
appreciation and/or gratitude for something the executive did. There are
at least two distinct advantages of earned non-monetary rewards over
perks (non-monetary rewards based on status), which make them
particularly suited for addressing several of the behavioral observations
highlighted in Part III.
First, earned non-monetary rewards may actually serve as an
incentive for the executive to act in a prosocial way because the receipt
of such rewards is contingent on the executive having to earn the reward
by doing something that others value, as opposed to being status-based.
Second, the act that gives rise to the earned non-monetary rewards
typically precedes the decision to give the reward, such that knowledge
of the reward occurs ex post after the executive has already acted. From
a behavioral science perspective an ex post reward decision is preferable
to the current ex ante structure of PFP, because it does not put the parties
in a position where they are forced to commit judgment errors about
future value, thus lessening the chance for optimism bias, sequencing
bias, and anchoring and adjustment. The drawback to ex post rewards is
that unless the executive has reason to expect that there might be a
reward based on some other signal, such as prior experience, the
executive may be less incentivized to achieve a particular goal.
The argument here is not that we should replace financial rewards
with non-monetary rewards (because for obvious reasons this would not
be desirable), but that we should reassess how we view and use non-
monetary rewards, particularly earned non-monetary rewards, in light of
the objective that executive compensation should incentivize executives
to act in the long-term interest of others, i.e., the corporation and its
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shareholders. In particular, if the concept of acting in the long-term
interest of the corporation and its shareholders extends beyond mere
long-term financial interest, then the heavy reliance on financial
targets to motivate executives risks crowding out other behaviors and
instincts that could bring a more sustainable vision of what "long-term
interest" means.
Drawing on the behavioral insights developed in Part III, the
proposals discussed above in Part IV provide specific ways in which we
can improve upon the PFP paradigm, not overthrow it. As this Part
proposes, this can be done by focusing on the behavioral aspects of
human decision-making and motivation, in addition to contemplating the
economics of the compensation contract.
The potential drawbacks to the proposals outlined in this Part are
three-fold. First, implementing some of the proposals, such as modeling
for specific executive traits, may result in significant transaction costs
that make implementation infeasible. While modeling for specific
executive traits does add a layer of complexity to the compensation
process, as discussed in Part III, models already exist for capturing
individual characteristics. Second, an attempt to address one behavioral
dynamic may actually have a cross-cutting effect by unwittingly
encouraging another behavioral dynamic. For example, as discussed in
Part III, the efficacy of shaming techniques may be limited if in fact
firms are herding. Similarly, a switch to more ex post rewards could
actually enhance the outcome bias concerns discussed in Part III. Third,
the effects of these proposals will be difficult to quantify and measure.
Difficulty, however, does not imply impossibility. Empiricists and
behavioral researchers constantly develop test suites and models to study
the relationship between an observed behavior pattern and a change in an
external factor. The exercise here should be no different.
V. CONCLUSION
The push to implement PFP in executive compensation contracts
was in response to perceived crises of greed and excess in the corporate
world. While a lot of attention was spent developing the economic case
for PFP, the human case which considers how humans actually make
decisions, are motivated, and value rewards, was ignored and not
robustly developed.
In other areas such as health care, education, and mid-manager
business settings, PFP is on the wane. Interestingly enough however, as
PFP has started a descent in other areas, it is experiencing a continued
normative ascent in the executive compensation space. Choices about the
[Vol. 41:91
BEYOND ECONOMICS INPA YFOR PERFORMANCE
objectives and the design of executive compensation, link to other
critical policy and doctrinal questions. What type of business culture do
we create by encouraging executives to measure their worth against
financial yardsticks? What types of people do we incentivize to become
executives by creating such a system? What conception of the
corporation does our choice of executive compensation design support
and encourage? And, what does it mean to align the executive's interest
with that of shareholders, given today's environment where many
shareholders often act in ways that are antithetical to the best interest of
the firm? In addition, the problem of designing compensation packages
that incentivize executives to perform well invites us to consider two
fundamental questions: (1) what definition should we ascribe to what it
means to "perform well," and, relatedly, (2) what are the optimal
incentives that encourage executives to perform well at the least cost to
the company?
It has been close to two decades since PFP made its mark on the
scene. In response to each crisis, the response of PFP proponents has
been to focus on the economics of the relationship and insist that PFP
performance itself is not the problem, but rather the way PFP has been
implemented. While economics and care in implementation no doubt
count, behavioral literature suggests that even if we were to achieve the
impossible of designing contracts that ex ante tightly align the
economics of pay and performance, these contracts will be unsatisfactory
because they will be riddled with judgments of error and faulty
assumptions about how human beings behave.
PFP as a sustainable and reliable model for executive compensation
faces a choice--either continue to focus solely on the economics, which
thus far has yielded questionable results, or expand its perspective to
incorporate learning from other disciplines on how people are actually
motivated, and how they make judgments that require decisions about a
time in the future. By necessity, this involves wrestling with the
behavioral dynamics that impact the decision-making process. To ignore
these behavioral realities is to settle for less than the best result for the
promise of PFP.
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